CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context

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CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONSOVERVIEWIn this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context. In other words, choose an organization that is dealing with Human Resource policies, strategies, and procedures. Next, apply the statesmanship model discussed Module 1: Week 1 to this situation. The overarching idea of statesmanship is the call for moral character. In the context of this assignment, how can this model be applied to the situation at hand? You will apply the Statesmanship model needed to deal with challenges of human resources policies, strategies, and procedures. Remember to also discuss the importance of the following:  Covenant of hesed Covenant of ethics Performance Evaluation StatecraftINSTRUCTIONS Case Study scenarios must be taken from documented (published) public administration contexts; no hypotheticals are allowed. o You can focus on one public administration organization or may refer to a particular situation (well-documented by the research) that public administrators faced during an actual event(s). All ideas you should be supported with sound reason and citations from the required readings and presentations, and additional resources.  Paper should be 4–5 double-spaced pages of content in length (this does not include title page or reference pages).o Paper should be in current APA format.o Headings should be included and must conform to the content categories listed (i.e., Covenant of hesed, Covenant of ethics, Performance Evaluation, etc.). 3–5 additional scholarly sources must be used. They need to be scholarly and provide relevant public administration theory and practices.  All required reading and presentations from the assigned reading must be cited. Integrate biblical principles within the analysis of the paper. Unacceptable sources: Wikipedia, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and websites. Acceptable sources: scholarly articles published within the last eight years.Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context
PADM 610 Case Study: Human Resources Assignment Instructions Overview In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context. In other words, choose an organization that is dealing with Human Resource policies, strategies, and procedures. Next, apply the statesmanship model discussed Module 1: Week 1 to this situation. The overarching idea of statesmanship is the call for moral character. In the context of this assignment, how can this model be applied to the situation at hand? You will apply the Statesmanship model needed to deal with challenges of human resources policies, strategies, and procedures. Remember to also discuss the importance of the following: Covenant of hesed Covenant of ethics Performance Evaluation Statecraft Instructions Case Study scenarios must be taken from documented (published) public administration contexts; no hypotheticals are allowed.  You can focus on one public administration organization or may refer to a particular situation (well-documented by the research) that public administrators faced during an actual event(s). All ideas you should be supported with sound reason and citations from the required readings and presentations, and additional resources. Paper should be 4–5 double-spaced pages of content in length (this does not include title page or reference pages). Paper should be in current APA format. Headings should be included and must conform to the content categories listed (i.e., Covenant of hesed, Covenant of ethics, Performance Evaluation, etc.). 3–5 additional scholarly sources must be used. They need to be scholarly and provide relevant public administration theory and practices. All required reading and presentations from the assigned reading must be cited. Integrate biblical principles within the analysis of the paper. Unacceptable sources: Wikipedia, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and websites. Acceptable sources: scholarly articles published within the last eight years. Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.
CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context
ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 49 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behaviour in Public Management Armenia ANDRONICEANU 1 Abstract : The role of ethical behaviour in public management is crucial for the public organizations’ results and for the citizens’ satisfaction. This idea is already demonstrated by several studies and the practitioners share it. There are limited knowledge about how the newly emerged politico -administrative dichotomy in the Balkans has influenced the formation of ethical behaviour along the management process and how this should be updated, taking into account that it is permanently influenced by regional cultures, by public managers and politicians. The main objectives of this paper are: (1) to identify some features of the human resources behaviour during th e management process; (2) to underline the main reasons for unethical behaviour, (3) to identify some recommendations for creating and maintaining an ethically -oriented behaviour. The research methodology was based on questionnaire and included forty perso ns from the central government level. The paper concludes with some recommendations for improving the ethical behaviour of the human resources involved in the public management process at the central Romanian government . Keywords : ethics; human resources; public management JEL : J21; J24; D23 . Introduction The research starts from the assumption that decisions and behaviours are influenced by values. People often have different values and ways of behaving. Although these different values make people behave differently, yet they should work together in organizations that have common values and ethical behaviour . A key role in this adaptation process have public managers. They have to set up the values and to follow them in the managemen t process. It is necessary for the public managers to foster common value systems within their structures, if they want decisions and human behaviours to be consistent with their objectives. This consistency is possible if the organizations’ values are kno wn and agreed by every employee. It should be a sort of “soft” partnership based on ethical values. (Burlacu, 2011). The word “ethics” is often in the news nowadays. Ethics is a philosophical term derived from the Greek word “ethos” meaning character or c ustom (Calciu, 1 Professor PhD, The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Facu lty of Administration and Public Management, Bucharest, Romania, e -mail: [email protected] ADMINISTR AŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavior in Public Management 50 2009). This definition is linked with effective leadership in organizations. (Bovaird, Hughes, 1995). Certain organizations will commit themselves to this philosophy through a formal pronouncement of a Code of Ethics or Standards of Conduct . Other private organizations, however, will be concerned with aspects of ethics of greater specificity, usefulness, and consistency. Formally defined, ethical behaviour is morally accepted as “good” and “right” as opposed to “bad” or “wrong” in a particu lar setting (Androniceanu, Abaluta, 2008). Organizations face a variety of changes and challenges that will have a profound impact on organizational dynamics and performance (Halachmi, 1995). A long -standing tradition of ethical behaviour is based on the p rinciples of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness. The ethical climate of an organization is composed by a set of beliefs about what correct behaviour is and how ethical issues will be handled. This climate sets the tone for decision making at all levels and in all circumstances (Androniceanu, 2011). Some of the factors and variables presented below were involved in the survey in order to emphasize the fact that ethical behaviour of the human resources is strongly influenced by ethical organizational envi ronment which is based on ethical core values of each person involved in the management process. The main attributes included in the survey are the following: personal self -interest; public interest; operating efficiency; individual friendships; team inter ests; social responsibility; personal morality; rules and standards of procedure; laws and professional codes. Standards for what constitutes ethical behaviour lie in a “grey area” where clear -cut right -versus -wrong answers may not always exist. As a resul t, unethical behaviour is sometimes imposed on public organizations by the formal environment (Popescu, R.I., 2008). However, ethical behaviour is in many cases strongly influenced by values in which public managers and the politicians believe. Their perso nal behaviour gives the others possibility to make a comparison between what the public managers and the politicians are saying about core ethical values of the public organization and how they apply these values in the management process. The research sur vey demonstrates that there are enough differences between these two dimensions. The differences are influences by several factors and variables. Identifying and knowing the content and the causes of these factors and variables may lead to the identificati on of ways to improve the ethical behaviour of human resources who are working in a public organization. The effective management of ethical issues requires that public organizations ensure that their public managers, politicians and the civil servants kno w which are the ethical values – and how to deal with ethical issues in their everyday work (Moldoveanu, Sabie, 2009). 1. Empirical survey on specific ethical values and ethical behaviour of public managers, civil servants and politicians It is now necessar y for the Romanian public managers and for the politicians to reconsider their fundamental values and beliefs, to see which ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 51 represent now deviates from what we think we set out to be, and what we would like public employees to see us to be. Ethical behavi our is acknowledged as a necessity in modern governments. There are some recent research studies conducted by different scholars. In the period 15 -20 February 2006, one Romanian academic group working inside the International Research Centre for Public Man agement from the Bucharest University of Economic Studies initiated an empirical survey on the ethical behaviour in the Centre of the Romanian Government (CRG). We set up this survey having the main objectives to know what the people understand by ethical values and ethical behaviour and to identify the main reasons for unethical behaviour occurrence in the CRG. Based on this, we made some recommendations for improving ethical behaviour, taking into account the general principles for managing ethics in the public sector. The survey was replicated in 2012 and the current paper includes the main findings. The purpose of the survey was to identify the main changes of human resources ethical behaviour . The results have been used afterwards for making recommendat ion regarding the appropriate essential ethical values and the needed changes for the Romanian public administration and especially for the central government body. The main dimensions of ethical behaviour considered and the meaning of each of them are th e following:  Utilitarian view of ethics — greatest good to the greatest number of people;  Individualist view of ethics — primary commitment to one’s long -term self -interests;  Moral -rights view of ethics — respects and protects the fundamental rights of a ll people;  Justice view of ethics — fair and impartial treatment of people according to legal rules and standards. Forty persons from the CRG have answered to the questionnaire, conceived having in mind the identification of the ethical profile of the peo ple at this level of the Romanian public administration. The sample consisted of 40 people including 32 men and 8 women. The structure by age group was: 23 -30 years – 10%; 31 -40 years – 20%; 41 -50 years – 40%; over 50 years – 30%. Structure grouped by level of education and the last graduate school was the following: graduate studies – 85%, post graduate studies – 10% and meanwhile college studies – 5%. Regarding the experience in public administration it is notable that most participants (55%) have 15 ye ars of experience in central public administration, followed by other 20% represented by people with an experience between 5 and 14 years. The rest of them (25%) have less than 4 years experience (between 1 – 4 years). ADMINISTR AŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavior in Public Management 52 Figur e 1. The sample structure by age Figure 2 shows the group structure on both political and administrative levels while figure 3 details the structure of the political group composed by 10 persons including 6 executive directors and 4 counsellors or adviso rs of the ministers. Figure 2. Sample structure on administrative and political levels Figure 3. The specific structure of the political level 41-50 years 40% over 50 years 30% 31-40 years 20% 23-30 years 10% 0 20 40 60 80 100 Political Level Administrative Level 01 23 456 78 910 Cabinet directors Councellors ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 53 Figure no. 4 presents the structure of the gro up from the administrative level: 30 persons -7 executive directors, 10 head of functional departments, 10 civil servants and 3 contracting people. Figure 4. The structure of the administrative level In our survey, we ha ve considered the following three categories of values as influencing the ethical behaviour of the human resources: a) Personal values – family influences, religious values, standards, and needs; b) Government values – supervisory behaviour , peer group norms a nd behaviour , policy statements and written rules; c) Environment values – government laws and regulations, societal norms and values. It is found (see Figure 5) that most of the people from the administrative level which have been questioned feel a strong i nfluence on their ethical behaviour coming from the last two categories of values. On the opposite part is the opinion of the people from the political level, who consider that their ethical behaviour is influenced by other factors and variables from the f irst category plus their political values. The main specific values considered in our survey were: political self – interest; individual friendships; team interest; social responsibility; personal morality; rules and standards procedures; laws and professio nal codes. Concerning the understanding of ethical values and behaviour through our survey, we discovered that more then 80% of the investigated people do not know much about the ethical values and behaviour . Figure 5 shows the extent to which each specif ic value influences the ethical behaviour of subjects during the management process : political self -interest – 30%; individual friendships – 15%; team interests – 5%; social responsibility – 5%; personal morality – 10%; rules and standard procedures – 30%; laws and professional codes – 5%. 0 2 4 6 8 10 Exe cutive Dir e ctor s He ad of De par tm e nts Civil s e r vants Contr acting pe ople ADMINISTR AŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavior in Public Management 54 Figure 5. Values that influence ethical behaviour More than 80% of the people involved in the survey mentioned that their ethical behaviour is strongly influenced by many other individua l factors and variables: personal perceptions, own belief, education, rules, administrative procedures and their status in the central public administration (see figure 6 ). The remaining respondents believe that their behaviour is influenced by their posit ion and status in the central government body. Figure 6. The main factors and variables that influence the behaviour of the human resources Political self interest; 30% Individual friendship; 15% Team interest; 5% Personal morality; 10% Rules and procedures; 30% Laws and professional codes5% Social responsibility 5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% Political self interest Individual friendship Team interest Personal morality Rules and procedures Laws and professional codes Social responsibility Status at the central level; 17% Rules; 22% Education; 18% Admin. procedures; 37% Ow n belief; 3% Personal perception; 2% ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 55 All people from the political level considered the first and the second factors as the most important in influencing their ethical behaviour . The rest of the investigated people appreciated that their ethical values and the behaviour are strongly influenced by the administrative procedures, which had the highest rank followed by rules an d education. Only 5% from the administrative level considered that their ethical behaviour is influenced by their personal perceptions and beliefs. As can be seen there is a strong difference between the political and the administrative level from the pers pective of ethical values. Nobody refer to the clear system of ethical values for the people who are working at the level of the government. More than 90% of the investigated people declared that they know the ethical values and follow them in their daily activities because they understand how important are in their relations with others and for the image of the institution they are working for. As demonstrated by our empirical research, people look at their leader and say, ‘should I follow this per son?’ One very important attribute is Integrity. When the leader loses legitimacy, the entire basis of an effective body comes down – fairness, equality and long lasting values. The proper governmental culture will collapse, and that is something no publ ic manager or politician can afford. If one government is known to hold corrupt structures with bad image and non -ethical behaviour of their politicians and public managers, no one would like to co -operate with such government. In the longer run, citize ns and the business environment do not want to be associated with such structures. Once a government or the public management representatives are regarded as corrupts, their level of legitimacy declines. The corollary is that, in a system where one govern ment subverts the law, it becomes much harder for other public organizations to operate “cleanly”. This is why ethical behaviour and ethical leadership are a necessity . The experience proves the fact that is a real need for public managers and politicians to set up clear ethical values and build a sustainable and effective system of practices to implement them. Following the results of our empirical study, credible leaders and politicians challenge the process by experimenting and taking risks in their wor k as a means to finding new and better ways of doing things. They inspire a shared vision among employees by envisioning the future and enlisting others to bring about that vision. They enable others to act by fostering collaboration and strengthening othe rs. Nearly half of public managers involved in research are credible leaders that encourage people by recognizing individual contributions and by celebrating their accomplishments. That means an ethical behaviour based on ethical values and morality. Most of the subjects considered that ethical behaviour is absolutely necessary when leaders attempt to implement reforms that are transformational in nature. The survey pointed out that there are two categories of leadership competences related with public man agers and with politicians: one category called ADMINISTR AŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavior in Public Management 56 “soft skills” and the second called “strong/technical skills”. It has been demonstrated that there are some critical leadership competencies confirmed as baseline for promoting ethical behaviour inside the ce ntre of the government: understanding the policies of other departments; understanding the particularities of the ministries and their environment; building relationships and networks; managing change; managing the public; managing the relationship with t he media; influencing, motivating, developing, retaining talent and creative human resources; managing conflict and dealing with problems of employees. According to the survey results, most of the public managers are focused most of the time on their depar tment activities only and therefore fail to identify the necessary links with other departments for the success of their work. The survey highlights the fact that leaders both civil servants and politicians need to fully understand how their departments: ( 1) fit into and support the larger government policy process and (2) enable their jurisdiction/agency to serve stakeholders. We can conclude that the ethical behaviours and the performance expectations are strongly influenced by the leadership knowledge, s kills, attitudes, and individual abilities. Most of the investigated people mentioned that there is a special internal code containing the main ethical values, but the problem is how to create an internal mechanism for meeting them along the management pro cess . The code of ethics for the civil servants has been approved few years ago, but the effect is minimal. The public managers and the civil servants are much more motivated to follow the legal framework and the job description than to make an effort for integrate the ethical values in their daily activities. Most of them said that if their initiatives are legal, that means they are ethical too. Nobody explained them the difference between rules, legal framework and ethical values and how could be possible to integrate all of this in their daily ethical behaviour . The majority of our respondents pointed out the lack of an internal mechanism with ethical standards for public sector. They mentioned that respect ethical values remain at the discretion of each employee which should comply with internal and regulatory framework only . They know the obligations from the job descriptions, but most of these documents are very similar. So most of them have the same rights and obligat ions. Concerning the political commitment for the ethical values it depends on the politicians, Cabinet Directors and also the personal counsellors of the ministers. Some of them, in a very empirically way, try to have an ethical behaviour , but not all the time. They are politicians and feel public institutions like a temporary placement of their political carrier. They are not very much interested to build a consistent and effective commitment of ethics to reinforce ethical conduct of people who are workin g in public institutions. Related with the decision making process, the survey identified a poor consultation between the politicians and the public managers. Usually, the dialogue between the politicians, executive public managers and the civil servants a t the centre of the government is very poor. Most of the time the people working on the ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 57 administrative level are very much involved in the implementation process of public policies not in the decision -making process. In this context the ethical values are not enough part of the politician working life. They consider these subject like secondary and because of that they are not interested for spending time in designing a functional mechanism for ethical values. Research has shown that people involved in the management process at the central government level have different opinions about the ethical values. The people from the administrative level are interested in having an ethical values system and they want to follow them together with the representatives f rom the political levels while politicians prefer not to have it. In conclusion, the people that were directly involved in management process at the CRG level do not have a unitary and coherent vision on these ethical values and behaviour. Based on the res earch results, in the next section of the paper were proposed several recommendations for increasing the ethical behaviour at the centre of the Romanian government. 2. Recommendations for increasing ethical behaviour at the centre of the Romanian governme nt One of the greatest challenges confronting any leader in this twenty first century is bridging the gap between strategy and getting people to execute. Leaders (politicians, executive public managers) direct people to focus on the right strategic issue s. Too often people cannot identify with a government’s strategy and likewise. Sometimes leaders are disconnected from the realities that people must face within the organization. If the leaders can properly bridge this gap (strategic vs. organizational ca pacity), then they should be able to create value. The decision making process at the centre of the government should be based on a strong dialogue between leaders and their people. If the right people are engaged, then everyone should be able to cut their way through the strategic jungle. If leaders fail to engage people in strategic execution, then creating value through leadership will be exceedingly difficult. Although it is true that most people are not good strategic thinkers, it is also true that peo ple want to contribute to a larger purpose that only the leader can convey. Therefore, communication is at the cornerstone of creating value through leadership. And given great communication, leaders from the centre of the government can close the gap betw een strategy and strategic execution. Although governments have sometimes different cultural, political and administrative expectations, they often face similar ethical challenges, and the responses in their ethics management show common characteristics. T he participants to the management process at the central government level need to have a point of reference in their approach. A consensus regarding the content of the ethical values is needed. Leaders, politicians and public managers should be open and fl exible along the management process and to follow the same values, rules and regulations. In the next paragraphs are presented some recommendations for building an efficient system of ethical values in public institutions. ADMINISTR AŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavior in Public Management 58 2.1. Training on the specific va lues concerning ethics and ethical behavior The training programs should be designed to help participants to understand ethical aspects of their work, their status and also the ethical aspects of the decision making process inside the public institutions . It should help them to know how to incorporate high ethical standards in their daily organizational life. During the training program people should learn how to deal with ethical issues under legal and political pressure. Professional socialization shoul d contribute to the development of them necessary judgment and skills enabling people to apply ethical principles in concrete circumstances. The participants should learn how to behave in order to get an impartial advice that can help the public managers a nd the politicians to create an environment in which people are more willing to confront and resolve ethical tensions and problems then to rise conflicts and dissatisfaction. Guidance and internal consultation mechanisms should be set up and explained in order to help the human resources to apply basic ethical standards in the workplace. 2.2. Setting up a special department in public institutions to monitor ethical values and behaviour The name of this special team could be “moral quality circles” and can work at the centre of the Romanian government as an independent body based on the same principles like “management quality circles”. 2.3. Designing and implementing a special ethical accounting mechanism in public organizations The internal mechanism should be based on the following values:  Respect for human dignity meaning to create culture that values employees, citizens, politicians; to produce safe public policies;  Respect for basic rights meaning to protect rights of employees, public managers, citizen s, and communities; to avoid anything that threatening safety, health, education, and living standards;  Respect for good public leadership meaning: to support social interest; to work inside the government and institutions to support and protect the publi c interest. Public leaders should be accountable for their actions to the public. Accountability should focus both on compliance with rules and ethical principles – and on the results achievement. Accountability mechanisms can be internal or can be provid ed by civil society. Mechanisms promoting accountability can be designed to provide adequate controls while allowing for appropriately flexible management. ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 59 The main steps for creating such mechanism are: o Clarifying the vision and mission statement, sett ing goals and objectives; o Presenting the principles and designing the core ethical values and the ethical standards at the workplace; o Disseminating, motivating and communicating the ethical standards and values; o Building teams oriented on ethical values and results; o Measuring performance; o Developing human resources ; o Increasing participative management; o Preparing for transition to the new public management model based on ethical values and competitive leadership in public organizations. 2.4. Create a c ode of moral principles That means to establish set standards of “good” and “bad” as opposed to “right” and “wrong”. Public servants need to know what their rights and obligations are in terms of exposing actual or suspected wrong doing within the public service. These should include clear rules and procedures for politicians and executive public managers to follow – and a formal chain of responsibility. Civil servants and some of the politicians also should know their rights and obligations related to eth ical values. 2.5. Create an ethical role model Following the experiences from other developed countries, usually top public managers and the politicians serve as ethical role models. All public managers and politicians can influence the ethical behavio ur of people who work for and with them. The practice rose that excessive pressure can foster unethical behaviour . Because of that, public managers should be realistic in setting performance goals for others (Ojo and Adebayo, 2012). They also must observe the ethical values through their daily life inside the public organizations. In this way they can become models for others around them. 2.6. Create a special codes of ethics for all people who are working for the centre of the government and also for oth er public organizations That means a formal statement of the centre of the government and also an organization’s values and ethical principles regarding how to behave in situations susceptible to the creation of ethical dilemmas. It should be reflected in the legal framework too. The Public Management Committee and the OECD Council recommended that the member countries have to take actions to ensure well – ADMINISTR AŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavior in Public Management 60 functioning institutions and systems for promoting ethical conduct in the public service. This can be achieved by:  developing and regularly reviewing policies, procedures, practices and institutions influencing ethical conduct in the public service;  promoting government action to maintain high standards of conduct and counter corruption in the public sec tor;  incorporating the ethical dimension into management frameworks to ensure that management practices are consistent with the values and principles of public service;  combining judiciously those aspects of ethics management systems based on ideals with t hose based on the respect of rules;  assessing the effects of public management reforms on public service ethical conduct;  using as a reference the Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service to ensure high standards of ethical conduct. The idea of this approach is to create a set of HR practices that work together to identify, develop, and promote talented people through the compliance with essential ethical values and leadership capacity. Conclusions As we can see in this paper, the absorpti on of the ethical values should happen in different ways, depending on the environment and the organizational culture and the particular characteristics of the human resources. A balance between political and administrative level should exist. This balance is generated by a system of ethical values and compliance mechanism in public institutions . An effective leader is one who makes a demonstrable impact on one or more of the ethical values presented in a positive way by influencing the behaviour and the performance of the others. In the new era of rapid changes and knowledge -based organizations, managerial work becomes increasingly a leadership task based on an ethical behaviour . Leadership is the primary force behind successful change, mainly because leaders empo wer human resources to act always by considering the permanent common set of ethical values. References 1. ANDRONICEANU, A. (2011). Transparency of the Romanian local public administration. Administration and Public Management Review , No. 17, pp. 33 -46. 2. ANDRONICEANU, A. ABALUTA, O. (2008). Leadership and Management in the Public Sector: Values, Standards and Competencies in Ce ntral and Eastern Europe, NispaCEE Printing House Bratislava, Slovakia, pp. 35 -48. ADMINISTRATION AND PUB LIC MANAGEMENT  20/20 13 Ethical Values and the Human Resources Behavio ur in Public Management 61 3. BOVAIRD, T., HUGHES R . (1995). Re -engineering P ublic Sector Organizations: A Case Study of Radical Change in a British Local Authority . International Review of Administrative Sciences . 61: 355 -372. 4. BURLACU, S. (2011). Le role des ONG pour la prise de conscience de l’importance des partenariats publics -prives dans l’economie sociale en Roumanie, Administration and Public Management Review no. 17, pp. 120 -129. 5. CALCIU, R. (2009). The Ethics of the Civil Servants in the Eu ropean Union. Administration and Public Management Review, n o.12, pp.174 -182. 6. HALACHM I, A. (1995). Re -engineering and Public Management: Some Issues and Considerations. International Review of Administrative Sciences . 61(3) (September), pp.329 -341. 7. MOLDOVEANU, G. SABIE, O. (2009). Leadership Vector of the Organizational Development. Admini stration and Public Management Review no. 12, pp. 110 -119. 8. OJO, B., ADEBAYO, M. (2012). A factor analytic approach to us ers performance evaluation of the state land registry, Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management , Volume 7, I ssue 4, November, pp. 72 -82. 9. POPESCU R.I., (2008). The European Policy Regarding the Improvement of the Urban Environment. Administration and Public Management Review , no.10, pp.142 -150. R epro duce d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e c o pyrig ht o w ner. F urth er r e pro ductio n p ro hib ite d w ith out p erm is sio n.
CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context
898 Public Administration Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 6, pp. 898–909. © 2016 The Authors. Public Administration Review published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of The American Society for Public Administration. DOI: 10.1111/puar.12562. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. Karen Morgan is a research fellow in the School of Social and Community Medicine, University of Bristol, United Kingdom. She is currently working on a project piloting and evaluating interventions for male perpetrators of domestic abuse, and also on a project exploring experiences of female survivors of abuse. Previous work has included looking at the service needs of homeless women, and at the ethical framework governing local councillors in England. E-mail: [email protected] Richard Cowell is a reader in environmental planning in the School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, United Kingdom. His research interests cover theoretical and political aspects of the relationship between public policy and sustainable development. He has written widely on issues of governance, knowledge and decision making, policy integration, public participation, and trust, with a particular interest in ethics regulation. E-mail: [email protected] James Downe is a reader in public management and director of the Centre for Local and Regional Government Research, Cardiff Business School, United Kingdom. His current research interests include local government performance regimes, political accountability, public trust, and the ethical behavior of local politicians. He has more than 10 years of experience conducting evaluations on local government policy and has published widely in international journals. E-mail: [email protected] Abstract : Leadership is widely seen as having an important role in fostering ethical conduct in organizations, but the ways in which the actions of leaders intersect with formal ethics regulation in shaping conduct have been little researched. This article examines this issue through a qualitative study of the operation of the “ethical framework” for English local government, which entailed all councils adopting a code of conduct to regulate the behavior of local politicians. Studying local government provides an opportunity to examine how personal and managerial factors combine to influence ethical conduct and to analyze the ways in which ethical leadership is exercised through multiple people in leadership roles (politicians and managers). The article finds that organizations that exhibit consistently good conduct have multiple leaders who demonstrate good conduct but also act to preempt the escalation of problems and thereby minimize the explicit use of ethics regulation. Practitioner Points • The actions of leaders are important in promoting good conduct and fostering an ethical culture. • The promotion of good conduct within complex organizations can be enhanced when different categories of leaders work in concert. • Leaders need to be willing to intervene informally to steer behavior in their organizations and resolve emerging problems rather than relying on formal regulatory mechanisms. • The personal moral credibility of leaders can be very important in enhancing the effectiveness of formal ethics regulation. James Downe Richard Cowell Cardiff University , United Kingdom Karen Morgan University of Bristol, United Kingdom What Determines Ethical Behavior in Public Organizations: Is It Rules or Leadership? E thics is a key component of good governance (Perry et al. 2014 ) and has significant potential to affect public trust in all forms of government (Joyce 2014 ). Previous research has identified a number of factors that can shape standards of conduct within an organization, among which the role of leadership has attracted significant attention (Grojean et al. 2004; Steinbauer et al. 2014 ). Indeed, the ethical behavior of leaders has come to assume global importance, with leaders being implicated in high-profile ethical scandals and integrity violations (Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014 ; Tonge, Greer, and Lawton 2003 ). Researchers are identifying an array of beneficial outcomes arising from “ethical leadership,” including increased willingness of employees to use voice to improve their organization, greater employee job satisfaction and sense of well-being, and increased trust in organization leaders, both from employees and the public (see, e.g., Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015 ; Hassan 2015 ; Wang and Van Wart 2007 ). Much effort has also been applied to delineate the actions and behaviors that leaders can undertake to enhance ethics, including aspects of leadership style that create a culture in which good conduct is maintained (Huberts 2014 ; Lasthuizen 2008 ). Nevertheless, analysis of the impact of leadership and its role in fostering ethical behavior remains underdeveloped (Menzel 2015 ), especially in the public sector (Heres and Lasthuizen 2012 ; Van Wart 2003; Weinberg 2014 ), with insufficient testing of theory against empirical research compared with business ethics (Lawton and Doig 2005 ; Mayer et al. 2012 ; Perry 2015 ; notable exceptions are Hassan 2015 ; Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014 ). Moreover, while it is widely recognized that leaders can exert influence through their character and personal conduct as well as by taking managerial actions to regulate the conduct of others (through issuing guidance or processes of sanctions and rewards), there is relatively little research that considers the causal relationships between leaders, systems of ethics regulation, and resulting standards of behavior. Indeed, Six and Lawton ( 2013 ) suggest there is little theory about the best combination of value- based and compliance-based policies. This article responds to these gaps by examining the roles played by leaders in shaping the ethical What Determines Ethical Behavior in Public Organizations: Is It Rules or Leadership? 899 performance of local governments in England. Local government is a vital focus for ethics research, given that local jurisdictions across the globe have democratic mandates and responsibilities for disbursing significant quantities of public funds. In addition, English local government has been subject to a period of intensified formal ethics regulation, including a reinforced role for codes of conduct. Consequently, local government in England is a valuable case study for considering our key research question: how do the activities of leaders intersect with the more formal, codified provisions of ethics regulation in promoting good conduct? The structure of local government also makes it insightful for understanding the contextual conditions in which ethical leadership unfolds. Much literature in this area assumes an undue homogeneity to “the organization” or “the leader” (Menzel 2015 ; Van Wart 2003). Leadership/integrity research has been “relatively narrow in scope” (Palanski and Yammarino 2007 , 171), often focusing on managers in public agencies (Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014 ; Lasthuizen 2008 ; Macaulay and Lawton 2006 ) in largely American organizations (Eisenbeiss and Brodbeck 2014 ) more than elected representatives (exceptions are De Vries 2002; Schumaker and Kelly 2011 ). Yet English local government combines managerial and political leaders and thereby enables us to understand multiple leaders’ roles (e.g., shared leadership; see Crosby 2010 ) and the politics–administration dichotomy (Georgiou 2014 ) in promoting ethical conduct. The structure of the article is as follows: In the next section, we review how existing research conceives of the relationship between leaders’ activities and ethics regulations, with a particular focus on leadership studies. We argue that translational models of power (after Latour 1986 ) provide valuable conceptual and methodological sensitivity to how different elements combine in the exercise of agency in organizations. We then outline the institutional context of the ethical framework for local government in England. After elaborating our research design, we set out our findings on how those in leadership positions shape ethical behavior. In the final section, we offer some conclusions and suggestions for future research. Conceptualizing the Role of Leadership How Leaders Act on Ethics Leadership can be defined as “a process of social influence whereby a leader steers members of a group towards a goal” (Bryman 1992 , 2), and much of the literature linking leadership to ethics falls into two broad sets. As Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green ( 2015 ) explain, attention has been given to defining the moral principles or qualities that leaders ought to demonstrate and adhere to (the goals), but they also suggest a shift in research from issues of definition toward identifying the contents and actions of those who exercise leadership over ethics and capturing the influence that they exert. An important conceptual construct in this agenda is ethical leadership, which is most commonly defined as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making” (Brown, Treviño, and Harrison 2005 , 120). Researchers have sought to further specify the concept by identifying its key components based on modes of promoting conduct, notably, being a moral person (exemplified by a leader ’ s traits, behaviors, and how he or she makes decisions) and a being moral manager (when a leader creates moral codes for others through guidance, clear communication, and systems of rewards and discipline) (Treviño, Hartman, and Brown 2000 ). Similarly, De Hoogh and Den Hartog (2008) distinguish three elements of ethical leadership, consisting of morality and fairness, role clarification, and power sharing. For Hassan, Wright, and Yukl ( 2014 ), ethical leadership is made up of being an ethical role model, treating people fairly, and actively managing ethics in the organization. Overall, although grouped in different ways, the existing literature sorts the effects and actions of leaders in relation to ethics into two groups: those emanating from the nature and behavior of the leader as a person, encouraging emulation, and those arising from the systems and practices that they set up to regulate conduct on their behalf. Although research on ethical leadership has grown rapidly, analysis in this field faces a number of issues. The first of these concerns whether ethical leadership is conceptually distinct from other leadership models such as transactional leadership or transformational leadership. The latter entails providing individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and idealized influence (Bass 1990 ). Thus, leaders are in a position to set an example and influence the behavior of people around them as people learn by observing and emulating attractive and credible models (Bandura 1977 ). With transactional leadership, leaders intervene only to set parameters, reward good performance, and discipline when standards are not met. It is often characterized as a more passive style of leadership. The ethical behavior of leaders also forms a key component of other leadership theories, including authentic leadership, spiritual leadership, and servant leadership (Eisenbeiss 2012 ; Yukl et al. 2013 ). For example, “ethical leaders use transactional forms of leadership and authentic leaders don ’ t” (Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh 2011b, 52). If the relationship between such leadership theories is “blurred” and overlapping (Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015 ), this is unsurprising given that most such theories—explicitly ethical or otherwise—are essentially concerned with agency, that is, how influence over others can be achieved. This leads to a second issue: the criticism that ethical leadership constructs remain vague because in focusing on influencing mechanisms, they do not specify normative reference points that ethical leaders can use in promoting followers to behave ethically (Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015 ; Eisenbeiss 2012 ). In principle, therefore, transformational leaders can promote ethical or unethical behavior. We do not seek to define normative principles of conduct in this article, although we note that researchers might do more to connect the modes of governance of ethics to the different objects (different norms and principles) to be governed (Jessop 1997 ). Local government is a vital focus for ethics research, given that local jurisdictions across the globe have democratic man- dates and responsibilities for disbursing signifi cant quantities of public funds. 900 Public Administration Review November | December 2016 On a prima facie basis, one might regard the categorization of ethical leadership as a sufficient explanatory construct, in that it represents an effort comprehensively to specify dimensions of agency. However, questions remain about how leaders combine action as “moral persons” and “moral managers” to influence ethical conduct (Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh 2011a). Statistical analysis can tell us the explanatory power of techniques of moral management, vis-á-vis being a “moral person,” but not how leaders combine formal regulatory processes with social learning. One question in particular is that of “reach,” which concerns how far leaders can shape what happens across organizations, including in the myriad contexts in which they are not co-present with others. Such concerns direct our attention to examining the use of ethics regulation mechanisms. The Use of Ethics Codes A common device for regulating conduct is to draw up an ethics code, which is a written framework used by organizations to specify and then shape what is regarded as appropriate conduct. The International City/County Management Association, for example, has had an ethics code in place for more than 90 years (Svara 2014 ). The use of codes, with supportive guidance and mechanisms of reward or sanction, has proliferated since the 1980s. Such techniques form a component of ethical leadership as examples of the practices required for being “a moral manager” (Huberts 2014 ). The growth in the use of codes has not, however, been accompanied by sufficient analysis into their impact and whether ethical behavior has improved as a result (Beeri et al. 2013 ; Jensen, Sandström, and Helin 2009 ), and there remains much debate about how codes intersect with other actions and regulatory institutions for ensuring compliance (Svara 2014 ). The role of leaders is important here. At a basic level, in the private sector, it will fall to senior managers to decide whether to introduce ethics codes and what their form and content will be. Leaders may be aware that the adoption of an ethics code can be effective in increasing awareness of ethical principles and a useful management tool in fostering an ethical climate within an organization (Beeri et al. 2013 ; Treviño et al. 1999 ). However, how leaders effect the implementation of ethics codes warrant as much attention as adoption decisions (Svara 2014 ), and here the limited research available suggests a rather nuanced set of processes at work. In their meta-analysis of ethical leadership outcomes, Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green ( 2015 ) usefully unpack the “transactional” dimension of being a moral manager, embracing (1) active management (based on monitoring conduct, issuing rewards), (2) passive management (taking action after a problem), or (3) leaders adopting a more laissez-faire approach. They found negative correlations between ethical leadership and (3) but also (2) and some positive correlations with more proactive measures. The sense emerging from ethical leadership research is that passive transactional approaches to influencing conduct, relying on regulation, are unlikely to be adequate (Eisenbeiss 2012 ), a finding that chimes with wider research on ethics codes. Codes have been criticized as being too abstract, coercive, and unworkable while producing red tape and restricting practical options (OECD 1996 ). Codes of ethics are also seen as insufficient to achieve change or govern conduct without other social processes. Ultimately, the success of codes is dependent on the culture of the organization (Ethics Resource Center 2005 ), “where people naturally do the right thing when faced with dilemmas” (Back 2006 , 9). Leaders can play a significant role in helping set this ethical culture (Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014 ), as they have the scope formally to waive or less formally to ignore ethics codes (as with Enron; see Tonge, Greer, and Lawton 2003 ). Attention to the potential role of leaders shows that codes do not “act” unless interpreted and translated into actions by human agents. Our task is to trace the causal mechanisms through which leaders work with ethics regulation, and the outcomes that arise, to elucidate the predominantly statistical analyses of ethical leadership research to date (Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015 ). In so doing, we can determine how the “moral person” dimensions of ethical leadership come to bear on managerial actions rather than viewing them as separate modes of influence. The importance of doing this becomes clearer, once we acknowledge both the complexity of ethics in organizations and the limits of codification. Leaders, Codes, and Agency in Complex Organizations Much of the research on ethical governance and leadership has taken a rather simplistic view of organizations. Those who are the leaders is assumed to be clear. They are few in number and occupy a clear hierarchical position of authority within an organization from which influence on conduct can be exercised. Indeed, in response to the potential existence of a multiplicity of ethical cultures in organizations, the role of leaders is to create a “unified climate,” playing different roles at different levels and providing strategic leadership. There is some evidence to suggest that if leaders across different levels of the organization convey similar messages through training, this will create shared cognitions (Grojean et al. 2004). However, this simple and rather linear view of how agency is exercised faces two problems. One is that organizations can embrace multiple normalization processes, acting on and through human agents positioned within heterogeneous networks. Local government, for example, embraces political and managerial leaders, and norms for judgment may emanate from conceptions of electoral mandate, party, and constituency (for politicians) or from professional values or divergent goals such as efficiency and delivery (for managers) (Cowell, Downe, and Morgan 2014 ). Thus, the enhancement of conduct across an organization can be seen not just as a simple issue of implementing a single code of ethics but also as a struggle to assert the importance of a particular set of principles in the face of other bases for judgment. In shared-power worlds, multiple norms must be navigated (Crosby 2010 ). The second problem is that the codification of ethics in documented statements—as a basis for communication and regulation—can never fully capture and direct how decisions should be made across the A common device for regulat- ing conduct is to draw up an ethics code, which is a written framework used by organiza- tions to specify and then shape what is regarded as appropriate conduct. What Determines Ethical Behavior in Public Organizations: Is It Rules or Leadership? 901 diversity of situations when ethical issues arise (Jensen, Sandström, and Helin 2009 ; West and Davis 2011 ). Applying principles to contexts often entails further reinterpretation. Moreover, there is potential for principles of good governance to conflict, such as the tensions between integrity, transparency, and efficiency (De Vries 2002; Van der Wal, de Graaf, and Lawton 2011). The ultimate expression of dilemmas arising from the incompleteness of moral principles is the so-called dirty hands debate (Newbold 2005 ; Walzer 1973 ), concerning the morality of overriding important ethical principles to achieve greater goals. One can imagine that such dilemmas fall heavily on those in leadership roles, especially in governments where multiple constituencies are involved. Tracing the means by which agency is exercised over conduct in practice requires a conceptual and methodological perspective that can integrate the different effects of leaders (personal or through rules or other practices). A valuable approach, already used in other areas of business ethics (Jensen, Sandström, and Helin 2009 ) and public administration research (Feldman et al. 2006 ), is the conception of power as translation. For Latour ( 1986 ), it is unhelpful to conceive of power in potentia , as something inherently possessed by someone (e.g., a leader, or an idea or principle), as it may not automatically lead to anything. Rather, power is better analyzed in actu , as an effect resulting from (and revealed by) the translation of an order or principle into the actions of others. By focusing on agency as a social process of translation, we can observe the combination of elements that come together to align conduct and see this as a collective, composite process entailing an array of practices—“countless, often competing local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement” (Rose and Miller 1992 , 175)—linking the actions of leaders, others, and regulations. Through such a perspective on power, it becomes clearer which individuals actually lead on ethics, in terms of whether their actions change the frame of reference for others and the basis of their authority (e.g., moral, political, or technical expertise). It may be that ethics codes give durability to social practices and extend the agency of leaders into domains where they cannot be present. Alternatively, we may find that leaders are more thoroughly implicated in shaping adherence to the regulations and that aspects of character have reinforcing effects—that is, the nature of moral management is shaped by the detailed interventions of moral persons. The next section addresses the policy context in which leaders behave before examining the methods we used to assess the ways in which leaders can influence ethical behavior. The Ethical Framework for Local Government in England The emergence of the ethical framework for politicians in local government in England echoes international trends, as concerns about conduct and declining trust in public institutions have been translated into ethical codes, statements of values, and other organizational machinery for regulating conduct (Pharr and Putnam 2000 ). The 1997–2010 Labour governments were seeking to address public concerns about “sleaze” in political life as well as high- profile corruption scandals in a few local councils. One of its main interventions was to greatly reinforce the arrangements for regulating conduct in local government (the ethical framework). Under the Local Government Act 2000, all English local authorities were obliged to (1) adopt a code of conduct to regulate the behavior of elected members (also known as councillors); (2) establish a register of members’ interests, and (3) set up a standards committee to advise on the code, monitor its operation, and promote high standards of conduct. The act also created new bodies, notably, the Standards Board for England. Initially, the Standards Board took the lead role in the assessment and investigation of complaints, but when this task was decentralized to standards committees for each local council beginning in 2008, it adopted a more strategic regulatory role. It is important to note that the ethical framework was imposed on local government and its leaders and required them to adopt it. Rather than being made the responsibility of a single leader, the ethical framework implicated an array of leadership roles within English local councils. On the political side, these were the council leader (usually taken from the dominant political group) but also the leaders of the other political parties. On the officer side, a senior manager called the monitoring officer had responsibility for the management of the ethical framework and reported to the chief executive in each council. Standards committees were required to include independent chairs and a proportion of independent members to separate them from political influence (Lawton and Macaulay 2014 ). Therefore, we see how the implementation of the ethical framework was shaped by leaders with different forms of authority—electoral, professional/legal, and the moral authority of “independence.” Moreover, operationalizing the ethical framework had to take place within “a collection of agencies, laws and processes” that made up a wider integrity system (Six and Lawton 2013 , 640), including internal organizational efforts and external actors such as financial auditors, rules governing political parties, and the justice system. Methodology The majority of the research on ethical leadership is statistical and cross-sectional in nature (Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015 ; Hassan 2015 ), relying on surveys to measure ethical leadership and correlate it with effects (e.g., De Hoogh and Den Hartog 2008; Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh 2011b; Kolthoff, Erakovich, and Lasthuizen 2010 ; Mayer et al. 2012 ; Yukl et al. 2013 ). What remains deficient is research that moves from statistical associations to elucidating causal mechanisms. To address this, we have responded to the call for more detailed qualitative research (Hassan 2015 ) and used case studies to enable a deeper assessment of causal processes. Our research site is English local government, which consists of 353 local councils spanning small district councils (in a two-tier structure in which responsibility for council services is split with county councils) to larger unitary and metropolitan authorities. Councils are predominantly financed by grants from the central government (about 48 percent), with the remainder made up of business rates (charged to local companies, about 25 percent) and council tax (charged to local people, also about 25 percent). To this field, we applied a multiple case study design (Yin 1984 ), centered on nine local councils. Cases were selected purposively to embrace an array of contextual conditions and leadership situations deemed likely to bear on 902 Public Administration Review November | December 2016 patterns of conduct and their governance. Table 1 outlines the main variables that we used to select cases, and table 2 summarizes how these mapped onto each of our case studies. Structuring case study selection in this way was designed to provide a framework in which the causal effects of different leadership actions on conduct, the roles performed by ethics regulations, and the conditions that facilitated these effects could be teased out. The individuals and councils have been treated anonymously in all published output from this research. This article reports on data gathered in 2008 and 2010, a pivotal period in the implementation of the ethical framework, when more responsibility was being devolved from the Standards Board for England to individual councils. Visits were made to nine case studies in 2008, and repeat visits were made to six cases (A, B, C, D, E, and F) in 2010; the abolition of the Standards Board meant that we were unable to revisit the remaining three case studies. The principal source of data was semistructured interviews with key informants, including council leaders and leaders of party groups, chief executives, monitoring officers, chairs of standards committees, a range of nonexecutive councillors from different political parties, and senior officers. We felt that it was important to gather the views of not just the formal leaders in the organization (both political and managerial) but also a range of followers (e.g., those councillors not in formal leadership positions) to gain a wider perspective on how conduct was shaped, embracing both those leaders who might be expected to engage in steering conduct and those subjected to such actions (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007 ). Across the nine cases and two time points, 129 interviews were conducted, 111 of them face to face and 18 by telephone. All of the face-to-face interviews were recorded and transcribed. To operationalize our translational conception of power (Latour 1986 ), we adopted an interviewing approach that was agnostic about what shaped conduct and did not assume a priori that particular actors or ethics codes were the main drivers (Jensen, Sandström, and Helin 2009 ). We encouraged interviewees to detail how norms of conduct were shaped and transmitted in their council (Grojean et al. 2004), including how misconduct issues were identified and addressed, by whom, and with what effect. The effects of the ethical framework and the roles of leaders were certainly objects of analytical concern, but we drew information about their importance and agency both from answers to open- ended questions and from responses to specific questions posed about the code of conduct and political and managerial leaders. We analyzed the interview data through a thematic coding technique (after Flick 2002 ), utilizing codes defined from the analytical framework and research focus, to enable comparability of analysis across the multiple case studies. The coding was aided by NVivo qualitative software, which facilitated the categorization and collation of text data subject to multiple codes (e.g., type of conduct problem, type of leader [politician, chief executive, monitoring officer], and type of action [informal advice, complaints procedure], etc.). In assembling the analysis, we draw on the causal relationships revealed by the coding exercise, such that quotations offered are both constitutive of the arguments we are making and illustrative of wider patterns (Mason 2002 ). Findings and Analysis We found evidence across our case studies of the roles that leaders play in promoting and reinforcing good standards of conduct. Numerous respondents referred to the ways in which key individuals in the council—chief executives, monitoring officers, and political leaders—shaped its standards of conduct. In effect, those in leadership roles displayed ethical leadership. We also found such respondents accepting responsibility for conduct that flowed from their formal leadership roles. The mechanisms that leaders used echo the main factors highlighted in existing research but also show the more complex ways in which leaders seek to achieve outcomes and the position of formal ethics regulation. We begin by examining the evidence on leaders setting an example. Leaders Setting an Example Setting an example (or role modeling) is about the visible actions of leaders in how they behave within an organization, and it is a key component of ethical leadership (De Hoogh and Den Hartog 2008; Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014 ). This behavior helps inspire others to emulate and support them. What is important here is “action” and not rhetoric. There needs to be no gap between what a leader says and what he or she does, as leaders can be hypocritical by outlining the importance of moral values for the organization but not behaving under these rules themselves (Greenbaum, Mawritz, and Piccolo 2015 ). We found those in leadership roles setting an example in a number of our cases, especially those councils sustaining high standards of conduct, with these actions being recognized both by those seeking to set such an example and by potential recipients of this lesson. Table 1 Main Case Study Selection Criteria Factors Likely to Affect Ethical Conduct Selection Criteria or Proxy Measure Size: Larger councils are likely to be better resourced to deal with ethical issues than smaller ones (Berman and West 1995 )Selected small, medium, and large councils, measured by population Conduct history: Past problems with conduct may have a lasting effect (Greasley 2006 )Selected councils with few or no complaints under the ethical framework and those with large numbers of complaints , measured over the period May 2008 to March 2010 Management: Councils that are well managed may be more likely to display good standards of conductSelected councils with “good/excellent” and “weak” scores from the Audit Commission ’ s Comprehensive Performance Assessment * Socioeconomic makeup: The composition of the area may affect the ethical conduct of the organizations that serve them (Menzel and Benton 1991 )Selected councils with lower and higher than average levels of deprivation Political leadership: Consistency and change in political party control may affect conductSelected councils controlled by different political parties, those that had been governed by the same party for a long time, and those that had experienced recent changes in control * Beginning in 2002, councils were subject to Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs). These were conducted by the Audit Commission and combined judgments about the performance of local services with assessments of a council ’ s “corporate capacity” (its leadership, performance management, partnership working, and use of resources) to provide an overall score that was published in national league tables. What Determines Ethical Behavior in Public Organizations: Is It Rules or Leadership? 903 Table 2 Contextual Information on the Nine Case Study Councils Case Study Type of Local Authority Size (population in thousands) Conduct History (ethical complaints, May 2008–March 2010) Management (measured using CPA scores) Political History Strength of Independents (percentage of independent councillors, 2006–11) Thumbnail Sketch A District council131 12 Excellent (2003–04, 2008)Generally Conservative controlled, Conservative 2007–115% A relatively af uent district in southern England with a mainly stable pattern of political control. The council had achieved excellent CPA scores and experienced very few cases under the code of conduct. B London borough276 0 Good (2002–04), 3 * (2005–06), 4 * (2007–08)Generally Labour controlled, no overall control 2006–1010% A London borough with pockets of af uence and deprivation in which the former dominance of a single political party had declined. The council had experienced good to excellent CPA scores and had been proactive in its approach to ethical governance. The borough had experienced no formal complaints under the code. C District council119 25 Fair (2003–04), Good (2007)Generally Labour controlled, no overall control 2003–1132% A district in the Midlands in a relatively deprived area where the traditional dominance of one political party had given way to turbulent change. The council was improving its CPA score over time. There had been a large number of complaints under the code, most of them among members and between of cers and members. D District council149 26 Fair (2003–04, 2008)Mix of independent and no overall control, Conservative 2007–1116% A relatively af uent district in southern England with a largely rural area, which in recent years had seen growing single party control. The council had received “fair” CPA scores but had experienced problems with its corporate governance, including a large number of complaints under the code, most of them among members and between of cers and members. E Unitary 334 138 Good (2002), Excellent (2003–04), 3 * (2005–06), 4 * (2007–08) No overall control 1995–2007, Conservative 2007–118% A unitary council in the north of England, covering a largely rural and af uent area, in which only recently had one party secured overall control. The council had achieved good to excellent scores in the CPA and many complaints under the code (mainly from parish councils). F Metropolitan borough751 35 Good (2002–04), 4 * (2005, 2007), 3 * (2006, 2008) Controlled by both Labour and Conservative over time, no overall control 2004–119% A largely urban unitary authority in the north, serving an economically and ethnically diverse population, in which the former dominance of a single political party had given way. The council had achieved good to excellent scores in the CPA and had generated a large number of complaints under the code. G Unitary 176 36 Good (2002–04), 3 * (2005–08) No overall control over its existence5% A unitary council in southern England with a mostly af uent population, in which no single party had control. The council had recorded good CPA scores and had generated a moderate number of complaints under the code, although fewer than its parishes. H District council94 109 Poor (2007), Fair (2009) Generally Conservative controlled with Labour in control 1995–9913% A district council in the Midlands with an af uent population and a high level of stability in political control. The council had recorded poor CPA scores and had generated a very large number of complaints under the code, most of them by members against other members. I Metropolitan borough225 2 Weak (2002–04), 2 * (2005–08)Controlled over time by all three main political parties, no overall control 2007–112% A socially diverse and in places very deprived metropolitan area in northern England in which the former dominance of a single political party had declined. The council had achieved weak to fair CPA scores and a low number of complaints under the code. 904 Public Administration Review November | December 2016 Not making personal attacks was central in the ethical worldview of some, which supports the positive links between conscientiousness and ethical leadership identified by Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh (2011a). For example, the leader of council A was noted for refraining from shouting in the council chamber or making personal remarks: “[I] never ever personalize anything in a public meeting. You know … it doesn ’ t matter whether it ’ s a member or a constituent, never personalize anything. I feel very strongly about manners in council chamber … and at public meetings, wherever you are in public.” In council B, we saw something that most closely approached “values-based leadership” (Grojean et al. 2004), evidenced by a widespread recognition across interviewees that leaders promoted good conduct and, furthermore, that the organization should be defined by it. Many interviewees in council B commented spontaneously on the moral tone set by both the elected mayor and the chief executive, which supported and empowered the monitoring officer in taking a proactive approach to ethical risks. The chief executive explained, “There ’ s been a very strong tradition of doing good by being good. Doing the right things and doing things right. Having integrity and ethics as being central to the politics and purpose of the place.” This finding exemplifies the point that leaders are responsible for creating an environment for others to make the right choices (Brown 2007 ). How easily the behaviors of those in leadership roles translate into followership was dependent on wider issues of status, expertise, and trust, especially in terms of senior officer support. In some councils, monitoring officers were positioned as “leading” on ethics in their councils. In council A, which generally exhibited good conduct, the monitoring officer was “recognized nationally as a leading light” on the ethical framework, in terms of knowledge, and in council B, too, the expert authority of the monitoring officer—a long-standing senior lawyer—was widely accepted by councillors as issuing good advice on ethical issues (see also Eisenbeiss 2012 ). In council H, however, the organization experienced a high number of member- on-member complaints that were mostly politically motivated. Rather than taking a proactive role in attempting to resolve the complaints informally, the inexperienced monitoring officer simply referred the cases to the Standards Board for England. A member of the cabinet (the council ’ s decision-making body) being suspended for one month for failing to update his register of interests is an example of how the advice of a respected monitoring officer may have led to a different outcome. What these cases begin to show is the diverse ways in which individuals as “moral persons” connect to the operation of moral management in the form of compliance with ethics regulation. Indeed, for our case studies that displayed good conduct most consistently, compliance with the code was not necessarily the motivating factor (to which we return later), and the actions of leaders—political and managerial—were not easy to separate from norms and conventions shaping “how politics is done” locally. For example, in case study A, the chief executive suggested that there was “by and large a good working relationship between the members and politics doesn ’ t get in the way most of the time,” and rarely was there a need to bring cases under the ethical framework with a view to formal sanction. The effects of role modeling and social learning emanating from leaders can also be seen in the perpetuation of conduct problems. In cases that had experienced large numbers of complaints under the code and/or ongoing conduct issues, the council leadership was often implicated in a number of ways. Some politicians expected their leader to take the lead in attacking the opposition, potentially placing them at greater risk of overstepping the line of acceptable conduct (in terms, say, of using respectful language) than anyone else. Certain conceptions of being an effective political leader, held in some competitive party political environments, do not readily equate with being an ethical leader, illustrating the dilemmas of multiple normalizing processes that we introduced earlier. Moreover, what was constitutive of wider ethical problems in some councils was that senior councillors had become involved in the making of complaints for political advantage. For example, in case study H, claims of noncompliance with the ethics code were used deliberately to undermine opposition parties, fueling “tit-for-tat” spirals of accusation. It was often the case that party and council leaders acted as the focus for complaints from opposition parties, insofar as opponents sought to damage the group in power by attempting to undermine its leaders by presenting their behavior as unethical. The effects that leaders can exert often became clear when individuals in leadership roles changed. Between 2008 and 2010, the political control of council C changed, and the new leader announced that his party group would take action to prevent the endless cycle of antagonistic ethical complaints. He explained, I think by going on record as saying in the Council that we would never take anybody to the Standards Board, I would hope that meant that nobody would then take us to the Standards Board, then that then spread out across. I think the environment … is massively better than it was two years ago. It ’ s a lot more constructive and a lot more positive. … I won ’ t say in harmony, but at least in constructive criticism which it wasn ’ t before. Being seen to discourage personalized tit-for-tat politics was often integral to the modi operandi of the more effective ethical leaders. Again, however, we can see the ambiguous relationship between achieving good outcomes and the deployment of formal ethics regulation. Leaders Acting on Individuals This ambiguity is apparent again when we turn to the second set of ways in which leaders acted on ethics—being a moral manager in dealing with others to persuade them to maintain high standards of conduct (Hassan, Wright, and Yukl 2014 ). It often meant working informally to resolve complaints prior to (or avoiding) deploying the formal ethics machinery. This included having a quiet word with politicians whose behavior was “sailing close to the wind” and giving Certain conceptions of being an eff ective political leader, held in some competitive party political environments, do not readily equate with being an ethical leader. What Determines Ethical Behavior in Public Organizations: Is It Rules or Leadership? 905 them an opportunity to improve. That these practices occurred more often in some councils than in others, and reflected the extent of conduct issues in each case, suggests a significant causal effect. We saw extensive use of informal mechanisms of regulation by managerial leaders, notably in council B, which had a good reputation on conduct. Here politicians acknowledged that the chief executive “is very very skilled at managing concerns for members, whether they ’ re executive members or whether they ’ re backbench members. I ’ m sure that [the chief executive] deals with quite a lot of that stuff under the waterline, so we don ’ t tend to see too much of it.” In this council and others, leaders helped create an organizational environment in which people felt comfortable discussing potential ethical risks. In council G, the monitoring officer said that “where members have perhaps got involved where they shouldn ’ t have done on an issue, then … the chief executive or myself would have a word with them.” In councils with conduct problems, leaders were less prepared to intervene to support better conduct or head off problems. In council C, the chief executive did not play an active role. The task of explaining to members why their behavior was unacceptable in public meetings fell entirely on the monitoring officer. He explained, “I don ’ t have the time to spend nattering to people about minor issues in relation to ‘do you know what so-and-so said?’ ‘Do you know what somebody else said?’ In contrast to my predecessor, who spent a lot of time talking to members and being able to smooth things over sometimes.” We observed a complex network of personal actions—not always straightforward, hierarchical relationships between a single leader and his or her followers—involving different actors leading on shaping conduct in different councils and in different combinations. In council E, party group members (rather than the leader or monitoring officer) would have words with colleagues whose conduct was at risk of overstepping the line, and in council G, one group leader felt it his responsibility to take an informal role in acting on ethical issues outside his party. That leader explained, “intervene is not the right word, but just sort of gently say ‘Look is there an issue? We need to talk about this.’” We identified numerous incidents in which managerial and political leaders worked in concert to enhance the maintenance of good conduct. In council A, the chief executive explained that “me and the leader are a double act … we are the pivot between the members and the officers.” In council I, the deputy leader explained, Quite regularly the whips will address an issue if they see that it ’ s going to happen. A person thinking about going into business which would be contrary to their role as a councillor … an officer might say “This councillor ’ s really pushing this personal interest” … and the whipping process resolves a lot of issues like that. And that ’ s why I say the relationship between officers and senior members particularly has been quite reasonable because you know there ’ s an informal feedback at an early stage and the parties usually deal with that. 1 Our evidence also shows the value of leaders taking assertive steps to ensure that members attend training on ethics. In council B, the monitoring officer introduced annual reminders of training and “named and shamed” those who did not attend. In some cases, the push for training came additionally from the politicians. The joint leader of council F explained taking member training very seriously: “Our assistant whip leads on it. He ’ s very keen to see member training rolled out … we have a proper induction package now for new members which is helpful.” It was also clear that in councils that had persistent problems with poor conduct and repeated complaints under the code, training was more poorly attended or more sparely implemented. A failure of leaders to act in concert could be problematic, as “[f ]orces that pull the organization in different directions promote the existence of distinct subclimates, and a weak overall climate regarding ethics’ (Grojean et al. 2004, 233). We found a number of examples in which party discipline was less assiduously monitored and aligned. In council H, “I think certain party leaders have the desire to nip things in the bud. I think other party leaders don ’ t necessarily have the same desire.” In council F, the joint leader argued, “Well in my view if the person in question was a member of my party we would be taking firm disciplinary action ourselves, that the party of which he is a member seemed … well their leader throws his hands up and says ‘I ’ ve done all I can. I know what he ’ s like.’ I don ’ t think that ’ s good enough.” Mechanisms for exercising agency through party group discipline evaporated when councils had large numbers of independent councillors. By their very nature, independents have no group to discipline, and this situation was associated with conduct problems in a number of cases. Moreover, political independents often emerge and persist where there is a sense of antagonism toward preexisting public and political institutions such as the council, meaning that government-driven codes and organizational reputation are not prioritized in the judgments councillors make. In council C, the chief executive explained, “They ’ re independent. Given away in the name isn ’ t it? I don ’ t believe they have a formal whip system. . . . As there ’ s no party allegiance, you therefore lose that greater dimension.” In council D, a councillor observed that the independent group took “a perverse delight in being named in the paper every so often.” With independent councillors, all leaders are less likely to be seen as lacking legitimate authority and, no matter what their formal status, have little power in actu. What Role for the Code? The evidence presented here shows the variety of practices available to those in formal leadership positions to shape the conduct of their local council, with those exhibiting better conduct seeing leaders routinely applying and combining different practices. What is also apparent is a degree of ambiguity as to how far an agency is facilitated by “moral management”—enacting the formal requirements of the ethical framework. We now explore this issue in detail. The first major pattern is leaders distancing themselves from the ethical framework. Many of the leaders interviewed, even in councils Mechanisms for exercising agency through party group discipline evaporated when councils had large numbers of independent councillors. 906 Public Administration Review November | December 2016 with reputations for good conduct, relativized the importance—or were critical—of the actual practices of the ethical framework. In council A, “The older members who have been around longer, there is more sort of built into them. Partly because of the ethical framework but also more culture of doing the right thing.” “Additionality” was also hard to determine in councils that evidently reflected more frequently and openly on ethical issues. In council B, there was criticism from the monitoring officer that the national prescriptions were just a new set of rules on top of already detailed local provisions for good governance and open political conduct (see also Jensen, Sandström, and Helin 2009 ). The slow working of formal complaints procedures was also a frequent source of concern. The second major pattern appeared in councils that maintained good standards of conduct. Here, a key set of practices was working informally when risks emerged to keep people away from the formal procedures governing ethical conduct. Of course, this might be taken as an example of the efficacy of formal procedures—the risk of sanctions drives action to avert misconduct—although it is notable that recourse to formal mechanisms was more associated with councils with persistent ethical problems. However, even in cases of serious misconduct, the ethical framework was just one part of an assemblage of elements brought together by leaders to translate their goals into action. Supporting evidence can be found in two of the case study councils—A and B—which, although they generally displayed good conduct, had to deal with cases of individual councillors behaving in a criminal/fraudulent manner. In each case, a set of leaders including the chief executive, the monitoring officer, and party group leaders worked in concert to eject the people concerned from the council. These leaders were able to mobilize a conception of the council as an organization whose reputation mattered and that the individual risked tarnishing, with behavior clearly contravening acceptable norms. The council leader from case A explained, And I ’ m pleased to say she did when I asked her to resign … long before the Standards Board came in. When I heard what was happening I asked her to go. I ’ m pleased to say she went, too, it was her decision not mine but I would have asked her to go otherwise. To me it was blatantly obvious that she was not doing what a good … councillor should be doing. The existence of the ethical framework was an additional ingredient in the making of arguments, but it was not pivotal, as some councillors were removed without invoking formal complaints procedures. Indeed, sanctions available under the framework might not, on their own, have enabled the people to be removed as councillors. The chief executive in case B summarized as follows: “I ’ ve had conversations with councillors making them resign, although I haven ’ t had the power to make them resign.” It was the combination of elements beyond the formal powers of the ethical framework that created power in actu—that is, led to change. Combinations of a palpable ethical culture with widely shared ethical norms, political party norms, identity and discipline, and the mobilization of action by people who were trusted and could themselves be seen as embodying good standards of conduct together constructed a line of acceptable behavior that errant councillors would recognize they had crossed. In other councils, one or more of these elements was missing. Political and managerial leaders were more reluctant to intervene preemptively and relied on formal sanctions under the code of conduct. In many instances, however, these sanctions did not lead to significant change of behavior—typically in cases concerning treating others with respect and not using abusive language—as the councillors concerned did not take either the ethical framework, or the personal moral standing of those enacting complaints against them, as a legitimate basis for criticism. The third major pattern is that, although effective ethical leadership demands a perception that leaders act fairly (Hassan 2014), it seems that the actions of effective leaders is not characterized readily by conceptions of fairness that demand a neutral, hands-off approach and deference to formal procedures. Instead, making judgments about conduct and ethics—as a form of practical reason—is part of the day-to-day repertoire of actions of effective ethical leaders (Lawton and Macaulay 2004 ). This is vital given that, as we discussed earlier, codified principles are never a complete basis for action or adjudication: they require application in complex, heterogeneous situations. A formal ethics code for the organization as a whole is only one set of rules or norms governing conduct and requires negotiation with the criminal justice system, party membership rules, and so on. We found that ethical leaders were prepared to act on individuals themselves directly and did not expect that the code to govern at a distance. Indeed, in council I, an officer perspective on politicians was that they “take their lead from their leaders to some extent … certainly the leader of the council is keen to exert his morals and influence on behaviors and has made it very clear that if there are issues he wants to know about them.” Conceptions of “fairness as detached/impartial/neutral” also help explain why it was that standards committees—created in each council to oversee the ethical framework and promote high standards of conduct—did not become ethical leaders in most of our cases. They were much newer institutions than other actors in the council and less certain in their status. Moreover, many of the chairs of these committees (which are recruited to be independent from the council) saw it as vital that they be detached from the councillors, not to engage or intervene on a personal level, in order to retain their legitimacy in assessing individual cases. These findings open up a more fundamental reflection on the nature of leadership on ethics and the exercise of power. Standards committees, whatever their formal “powers,” simply could not act “on the ground,” proactively intervening in cases in the way that we saw both managerial and political leaders doing in those cases in which good conduct was the norm. Any “leadership” by standards committees was inevitably at the rather detached level as the promoters of abstract principles. One component of ethical leadership is the opportunity to reward good ethical performance and apply discipline when standards are not met (e.g., Treviño, Hartman, and Brown 2000 ). However, the leaders in our case studies had few rewards for good behavior by councillors, and the formal sanctions were often perceived as inadequate. They could consist of providing an apology or, if regarded as more serious, lead to councillors being suspended for a period. Moreover, the status of the electoral mandate means that What Determines Ethical Behavior in Public Organizations: Is It Rules or Leadership? 907 misdemeanors identified under the code could not, in themselves, lead to councillors being ejected from the council. The uncertain power in actu of the ethical framework helps explain how those in leadership roles responded to it, which, in turn, reveals further insights about the roles of leaders in shaping conduct. Conclusions Our objective in this article has been to examine how the activities of leaders intersected with the more formal, codified provisions of ethics regulation in promoting good conduct. In so doing, we have responded to the call from Hassan, Wright, and Yukl ( 2014 ) for more research on the influence of specific leadership behaviors on the ethical conduct of subordinates and that of Menzel ( 2015 ) to assess whether ethical codes make a difference. Building on the predominantly statistically based research on ethical leadership, our analysis used detailed qualitative analysis to trace the causal processes by which different elements of ethical leadership have an effect on conduct. Our research confirms that the actions of leaders can be important in promoting good conduct and fostering an ethical culture (Beeri et al. 2013 ), by acting in ways that reinforce and maintain high standards of conduct and tackling emerging problems. However, we also demonstrate the importance of leadership through counterfactual cases—when poor conduct persisted, leaders were often directly implicated or failed to undertake the actions we saw in the better-performing cases. Previous research has begun to interrogate which models of leadership or sets of actions are most effective at promoting good conduct. Some have argued that a values-based cultural approach is best (Treviño et al. 1999 ), while others have suggested that “role- modelling is considered the most crucial and influential means to foster followers’ ethical decision-making and behavior” (Heres and Lasthuizen 2012 , 458). One of the methodological merits of adopting a translational model of power and using it to trace actions and outcomes in the field is that it shows how different elements combine to effect agency and in what direction. We draw the following main conclusions. We found that ethical leadership is more than simply complying with rules, such as the code of conduct; personal moral values are also important (Eisenbeiss and Brodbeck 2014 ) in setting a tone, encouraging emulation, and adding authority to regulatory action. Our study supports previous research that has emphasized the importance of leaders who “walk the talk” (Greenbaum, Mawritz, and Piccolo 2015 ), thus offering positive ethical role models. Moreover, especially perhaps in potentially conflictual, political environments like local government, personal moral credibility can help leaders enact more formal regulatory action. In effect, “moral persons” help make the tools of “moral managers” work. Our second conclusion, following from the first, helps explain why the “transactional” dimensions of ethical leadership—issuing guidance, rewarding, sanctioning—have more ambivalent outcomes than the transformational dimensions (Bedi, Alpaslan, and Green 2015 ). Overall, we found that in councils that had maintained good conduct over long periods of time, there were leaders willing to intervene informally to steer behavior. Being an effective “moral manager” could entail acting to keep problems from escalating to a point that formal regulation might come into play. As tools of governance, codes of conduct “cannot substitute for dealing personally, courageously, reasonably, and creatively with the moral ambiguity that is the stuff of administrative life” (Chandler 1994 , 155). “Treating people fairly” remains a relevant component of ethical leadership (Hassan 2015 ), but this is fairness demonstrated in interpersonal dealings, from respected individuals, rather than the procedural neutrality of formal regulation. Indeed, excessive reporting of “unethical behavior” can produce cynicism within the organization (Menzel 2007 ) and exemplifies concerns that investing authority in codified procedures can represent an abnegation of responsibility. A particular reason for this—and central to our third set of conclusions—links to more fundamental issues with the governance of conduct through ethics codes. Codes are always simplifications and require careful interpretation to apply to the complex, heterogeneous settings of organizational life, and it is precisely where there is uncertainty that the qualities of particular organizational leaders become most apparent. Further effort to codify and define the multiple principles at work would not have improved this situation, or removed the need for effective practical judgment (Jensen, Sandström, and Helin 2009 ). However, leaders can help constitute and foster environments in which the informal exercising of practical judgment feels appropriate (see also Brown 2007 ). The importance of this was further demonstrated by the organizational setting of our research—local government—where there are multiple networks of expertise, hierarchical position, and electoral authority with the potential to reinforce different ethical norms. Moreover, party political competition within local government organizations creates distinctive (and under-researched) challenges for ethical leadership, not least how leaders may become implicated in or accused of poor conduct as part of political advantage seeking. In such settings, our research shows that the relationship between leadership and conduct outcomes reflects how multiple leaders interact around ethical issues. Political leaders can set an example through endorsing exemplary behavior, denouncing improper conduct, using rhetoric such as making speeches, and influencing their political group. Managerial leaders can provide resources to show that they take the issue seriously by appointing officers to support training and process complaints. Our analyses also provide pause for thought on whether having multiple, overlapping processes governing conduct in organizations is necessarily a problem requiring rationalization. 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CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context
Public Integrity, 17: 315–318, 2015 Copyright #American Society for Public Administration ISSN: 1099-9922 print/1558-0989 online DOI: 10.1080/10999922.2015.1065113 GUEST EDITORIAL Leadership in Public Administration: Creative and/or Ethical? Donald C. Menzel Northern Illinois University Is it possible for a leader to be both ethical and creative? Assuming you don ’t think the categories are mutually exclusive, have you ever wondered about what creative leadership is and how it might be achieved? There is a substantial literature about creative leadership, and a more modest one on ethical leadership, yet almost no reported research linking the two. In principle, the constructs are not in situcompatible with one another; one can be a creative leader without being an ethical one, or an ethical leader without being especially creative. But, and it ’s a big but, can creative leadership and ethical leadership be learned as complementary components of effectiveness? One school of thought asserts the “no”side and views all leadership traits as innate: You ’re either born with them, or you ’re not. Those on the “yes”side refuse to accept such determinism, but still struggle to understand the process by which one becomes an effective leader, a process that can often seem elusive, even mystical. Nonetheless, it is an axiom of modern management and education that not only can both creative and ethical leadership be learned, but that they should be learned. Indeed, there is no shortage of educational and training programs in the United States that purport to teach leadership and ethical decision-making skills. Nearly every textbook on the subject typically describes the transactional, transformational, entrepreneurial, transcendent, and charismatic styles of leadership. But could these not also have a creative dimension? A transactional leader is, by definition, one who is capable of ensur- ing that organizational members and processes work with minimum friction, thus producing a product or service that is high on quality and low on cost. Would not Henry Ford’ s amazing success in the development of a factory-assembled Model T qualify him as a transactional and creative leader? Or, how about Steve Jobs ’s transformational skills and vision that turned Apple into the giant success it is today? Surely he would be regarded as a creative leader as well. Further, consider Bill Gates and Microsoft, or Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook —they Correspondence should be sent to Donald C. Menzel, Ethics Management International, Northern Illinois University, 3421 Reynoldswood Drive, Tampa, FL 33618, USA. E-mail: [email protected] unquestionably could be considered entrepreneurial leaders with a creative bent. Transcendent leadership, demonstrating leadership beyond self-interest, comes to mind when the names of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela are mentioned—surely creative leaders too! U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton shared a strongly charismatic leadership quality that could be interpreted as creative. Therefore, creative leadership, as these examples suggest, is not necessarily a distinct quality that cannot coexist with other traits. Creative leadership is something more than having a vision or creating value or attracting followers. Creative leadership draws together three distinct but interconnected constructs — creativity, leadership, and innovation (Puccini, Mance, & Zacko-Smith, 2015). The ability to generate and execute innovative ideas is what separates creative from noncreative leaders. Traditional leaders tend to execute “tried-and-true”strategies, such as cost-cutting or product/ service extensions, but they rarely disrupt their governing bodies or industries, or create new product/service categories. What is ethical leadership? There are three basic ingredients: being an ethical role model to others, treating people fairly, and actively managing ethics in the organization. Leading with integrity is yet another way of describing ethical leadership. A person with integrity is honest, truthful, and unwilling to compromise values or principles for advancement or personal gain. It means taking personal responsibility for errors one may commit, and recognizing and crediting others for their work and contributions to the organization ’s mission. Why is ethical leadership important? Does this question even need to be asked? The question does need to be asked —and answered, because we too often take it for granted, and it is much too important to ignore. Two obvious, compelling reasons that it is important is that ethical leadership (1) makes a positive difference in organizational performance, and (2) builds public trust and confidence in public agencies. Consider a recent study of the impact of ethical leadership on workplace behavior. Hassan, Wright, and Yukl ( 2014) surveyed 161 managers in a large U.S. state government agency and reviewed reports and personnel records. The findings supported their hypothesis that ethical leadership (1) increases the willingness of public sector employees to report ethical problems to management, (2) strengthens the organizational commitment of employees, and (3) reduces the frequency of absenteeism. Building public trust and confidence in government organizations is no easy task. Indeed, there are numerous examples of the lack of ethical leadership corroding public trust. Several years ago, I conducted a case study of the ethical meltdown of a professionally managed local government in the Tampa Bay, Florida, region. The case involved educated, politically astute elected and appointed county officials who found themselves invoking the oft-used rationalization when there was no other direction to turn—“ I didn’t do anything unethical, illegal, or immoral. ”The story revolved around the attempt of a property appraiser employed by the government to sell his private property to the county; in the aftermath, the county attorney and the county administrator both had to resign, the property appraiser decided not to run for a fifth term of office, and a grand jury presentment concluded that the breadth of scandal surrounding this affair “will have a lasting impact on how the citizens view their officials and government ”(van Sant, Abel, & Blackwell, 2007). As a distraught citizen observed in a letter to the editor, this “sort of back-door deal causes residents to distrust the commission …a wink and a nod won ’tdo ”(Keep Delving Into What ’s Behind Sordid Land Deal, 2007). Did local government officials demonstrate ethical leadership? Hardly! Was public trust diminished? Without question! 316 D. C. MENZEL So the important question is: How does one become an ethical leader? Step one is to become ethically competent. It is hard to imagine an ethical leader who is not ethically competent. What, then, are the skills and qualities needed to become ethically competent? I would list five: (1) a commitment to high standards of personal and professional behavior, (2) a knowledge of relevant ethics codes and laws, (3) the ability to engage in ethical reasoning when confronted with challenging ethical situations, (4) the ability to identify and act on public service ethics and values, and (5) a commitment to promoting ethical practices and behaviors in public agencies and organizations. Implied in these five components are knowledge of the normative founda- tions of administrative ethics and a thorough grounding in organizational theory and behavior. The pursuit of ethical competence as a foundational building block for ethical leadership is not a one-time affair. Rather, it is a life-long endeavor that can involve missed opportunities, blind alleys, and, sometimes, blind spots and traps that can lead even the most ethically minded person astray. Consider the utilitarian trap. That is, leaders who believe it is their job to always make decisions that satisfy most employees in their organization may also, in doing so, be sacrificing the right thing to do. A manager who supports across-the-board pay raises may make many employees happy, but is it the fair thing to do for those who work is meritorious compared to those whose work is substandard? Majoritarianism has its place in a democratic society, but it can’ t be the only decision rule to follow in making ethical decisions. A utilitarian approach— calculating the best outcome for the most employees —can be perceived as, if not constitute the reality of, an exercise in manipulating the means to a desired end. Becoming an ethically competent leader is not an easy or simple task. One must sidestep traps and blind alleys and, above all, make a long-term commitment to leading with integrity. Such a commitment involves taking advantage of opportunities to stay ethically fit through programs and experiences offered by professional associations, educational institutions, and frequent self-study and reflection. Of course, an ethically competent person can become a de facto ethical leader merely by setting an example and engaging in advocacy. Ethical leadership is not rooted in a particular job title. So, what do creative leadership and ethical leadership have in common? Let ’s begin with motivation. Self-motivation and the ability to motivate others is a common property of both creative and ethical leadership. As an intrinsic property, self-motivation is essential to being creative and becoming ethically competent. Motivating others is central to creative leadership and an intentional, sometimes unconscious, feature of ethical leadership. While change and innovation are always forces to be reckoned with in creative leadership, they can be confound- ing influences on ethical leadership. Creative leaders must be able to master complexity to cre- ate change and, in a similar manner, ethical leaders face complexity in resolving thorny moral dilemmas. A persuasive argument can be made that ethical leadership and creative leadership share relational qualities, are both grounded in process (ethical reasoning), and both require self-reflection and imagination to produce positive results (Puccini et al., 2015). As Terry Cooper ( 2012) reminds us, one must develop a capacity to exercise one ’s moral imagination. While creative leadership, like its more generic form, can be viewed as improvisational, perhaps even as an experimental art, ethical leadership requires one to anticipate desired ethical outcomes while taking into consideration the situation at hand (Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009 ). In this sense, ethical leadership is improvisational, as it is not determined solely by the situation. There is no place for situational ethics in leading with integrity, and ethical leaders know that. LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 317 Becoming a creative leader is just as great a challenge as becoming an ethical leader. In fact, perhaps it ’s time to consider that ethicality and creativity, rather than existing on two separate continuums, are points along the same leadership spectrum. Both require persistence, patience, and much trial and error, along with a significant investment of self-reflection. Both also require that leaders maintain an insatiable quest over the course of their careers, an open mind for new knowledge, and a propensity to be responsible risk-takers. Above all else, creative and ethical leaders cannot compromise their authenticity, as to do so would surely sow de-motivating doubt among followers. Are you ready for the challenge this presents? Ready, set, go! … REFERENCES Cooper, T. L. (2012). The responsible administrator: An approach to ethics for the administrative role (6th ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Hassan, S., Wright, B. E., & Yukl, G. (2014). Does ethical leadership matter in government? Effects on organizational commitment, absenteeism, and willingness to report ethical problems. Public Administration Review,74(3), 333 –343. doi: 10.1111/puar.12216 Heifetz, R., Grashow, A., & Linsky, M. (2009). Leadership in a (permanent) crisis. Harvard Business Review,87(7/8), 62 –69. Keep Delving Into What ’s Behind Sordid Land Deal. (2007, June 27). St. Petersburg Times, p. A16. Puccini, G. J., Mance, M., & Zacko-Smith, J. (2015). Creative leadership: Its meaning and value for science, tech- nology and innovation . Retrieved fromhttp://www.academia.edu/1958027/CREATIVE_LEADERSHIP_ITS_- MEANING_AND_VALUE_FOR_SCIENCE_TECHNOLOGY_AND_INNOVATION van Sant, W., Abel, J., & Blackwell, T. (2007, August 29). Grand jury critical of Smith. St. Petersburg Times, p. A1. 318 D. C. MENZEL Copyright ofPublic Integrity isthe property ofTaylor &Francis Ltdand itscontent maynot be copied oremailed tomultiple sitesorposted toalistserv without thecopyright holder’s express writtenpermission. However,usersmayprint, download, oremail articles for individual use.
CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context
Public Performance & Management Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2012, pp. 489–508. © 2012 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. 1530-9576/2012 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PMR1530-9576350306 489 HOw t O MEASuRE PublIc ADMINIStRA tION PERfORMANcE A conceptual Model with Applications for budgeting, Human Resources Management, and Open Government wOutER V AN DOOREN cHIARA DE cAluwE University of Antwerp ZSuZSANNA lONtI Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development AbstrA ct: The economic crisis provides some insights on the role of measurement systems. As shown by the ongoing discussion of credit rating agencies by political actors and in the news media, measurement is not a neutral device, but an active agent in societal processes. Comparative measurements of international public administration are as frail, technocratic, and overly aggregated as bond ratings, but nonetheless are increasingly used by journalists, aid organizations, foreign investors, and, indeed, rating agencies to hold governments accountable. Better measurement is needed in public administration performance. This article builds on study reports from the OECD’s Government at a Glance project to address the issue of how to measure public administration performance. The fields of budgeting, human resources management, and open government illustrate both the potential and the challenge of such measurements. Keywords: budgeting, human resources management, open government, public administration performance the economic crisis provides some insights on the role of measurement systems in society. Most notably, the role of credit rating agencies has been discussed by political actors and in the news media. 1 this discussion shows that measurement is not a neutral device, but an active agent in societal processes. As in the case of bond ratings, comparative measurement of international public administration seems frail, technocratic, and overly aggregated (Arndt, 2007; Arndt & Oman, 2006; Van de walle, 2006). Nonetheless, these indicators are increasingly being used by journalists, aid organizations, foreign investors, and, indeed, rating agen- cies for holding governments accountable. Hence, better measurement of public administration performance is needed. the discussion that follows builds on study 490 PPMR / March 2012 reports from the Organization for Economic cooperation and Development’s (OEcD’s) Government at a Glance project to address the issue of how to measure public administration performance. the fields of budgeting, human resources management, and open government are used to illustrate both the potential and the challenge of measuring public administration performance. the current economic crisis is also a crisis of measurement. 2 In a 2005 cartoon by Randy Glasbergen, a banker offers a couple an interest-only mortgage, bal- loon mortgage, reverse mortgage, upside-down mortgage, inside-out mortgage, loop-the-loop mortgage, and a spinning double-Axel mortgage with a triple-lutz (Mortgage cartoon Glasbergen, 2005). the cartoon appeared two years ahead of the collapse of Northern Rock in the uK and three years before the height of the crisis in 2008. However, Glasbergen and other, more systematic observers, such as Roubini and taleb, were well aware of problems in the housing mortgage market. Measurement systems of both the public and private sectors failed to detect this undercurrent. the economic measurement models used by the national banks and the planning bureaus did not capture the trend, just as the credit agencies failed to adequately gauge the real value of the assets under scrutiny. today, national creditworthiness ratings are being discussed in response to notable downgrades of several eurozone countries along with Standard & Poor’s u.S. credit rating downgrade. Some critiques target the failure of measurement systems to reflect reality. An additional step is to seek the causes of the crisis in the measurement systems. the AAA ratings for complex collateralized debt obligations (cDOs), for instance, are blamed for having been at least a catalyst for the crisis. crotty (2009) asserts that the recent global financial boom and crisis might not have occurred if perverse incentives had not induced credit-rating agencies to give absurdly high ratings to illiquid, nontransparent, structured financial products. Interestingly, the same mechanism of bad ratings by the agencies before the crisis and overly strict ratings after the crisis has also been documented for the East Asian financial meltdown in 1997 (ferri, liu, & Stiglitz, 1999). Moreover, rating agencies’ power and lack of accountability to the public was also discussed before the crisis (Kerwer, 2005). for present purposes, there is no need for a thorough analysis of the ins and outs of the economic crisis. Yet the crisis does remind us that measurement systems are not neutral controls for policymakers in the cockpit of society. Measurement systems are themselves agents, and influence behavior through their workings. when measurement systems are used to hold organizations to account, it should be kept in mind that they influence the behavior of account givers as well as ac- count holders. therefore, both a critical attitude toward existing indicators as well as continuous efforts to improve measurement seem warranted. this is also true concerning performance measurement for public administration. Existing indicators on public administration performance—which usually go Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 491 under the banner of “governance indicators”—have been subject to some criticism. this is true even at the national level, but far more so for the purpose of interna- tional comparisons (Arndt, 2007; Van de walle, 2006). One of the main critiques of governance rankings targets their validity—do they measure what they claim to measure? Rankings such as the world bank governance indicators comprise a broad and unintelligible compilation of opinion surveys, risk assessments, and sector indicators (Arndt & Oman, 2006). typically, nonperceptual indicators on the system’s core functions are lacking. As a result, there is a risk of constructing an image of a country’s performance based on indicators that do not accurately reflect its performance. If these performance indicators are used for accountabil- ity purposes in a subsequent phase of governance, the consequences of invalid measurement become real. the present article does not offer further critique but, rather, proposes possible measurement improvements. the text is based on several research reports commis- sioned by the OEcD’s governance directorate, which is currently undertaking the large project called Government at a Glance. the focus is on doing measurement, rather than on further elaborating the functions and dysfunctions of measurement (for the latter, see, e.g., Hood, 2006; Radin, 2006). No subjective stance is taken on the utility or potentially negative effects of using performance measures. for public administration more than for fields such as education or health, an additional difficulty for measurement is the conceptual confusion on what public administration performance actually means. this article begins by exploring the conceptual foundation for indicators of public administration performance. based on this foundation, it discusses possible performance indicators in three areas of public administration: budgeting, human resources management, and open government. the conceptual Foundation of Public Administration Performance As suggested above, it is first necessary to sort out a number of definitional is- sues. the primary task is to define performance. there seems to be a common mainstream understanding of performance, but this definition is process-oriented and nonsubstantial. In order to measure public administration performance, a substantial definition of performance is required. the MAinstreAM deFinition oF PerForMAnce Performance is usually defined in terms of the outcomes and outputs that follow from a public production process (Hatry, 1999). this model seems to provide the dominant vocabulary used by public administration researchers and practitioners when discussing performance. Although some terminological issues remain, and although some analysts will primarily emphasize the importance of contextual 492 PPMR / March 2012 factors, the main building blocks have become widely accepted foci of public administration theory and practice. Outcomes are the result of activities that convert inputs to outputs. the transfor – mation of inputs, such as financial and human resources, to activities is mediated by the structure of government, cultural predispositions, and institutional and managerial arrangements. Outputs are the goods and services that public orga- nizations supply in response to demand. Outcomes are the consumption of the goods and services (intermediate outcomes) as well as the effects this consumption entails (final outcomes). the criterion for assessing outcome is added value (Moore, 1995). the added value of a private firm is the result of the aggregation of individual decisions to consume a service or good at a given price. A firm’s profit can be conceptualized as its outcome in society, since it is the sum of the values that individuals attach to a good or service, minus the costs of production. free-rider problems 3 and the positive and negative externalities of consumption, 4 however, mean that one cannot rely on individual consumption decisions for all goods and services (Musgrave, 1959). for public services, although the criterion of added value remains intact, the notion of public value replaces private value. In the absence of monetary profits, it is much more difficult for public organizations to assess outcomes. subst Antive APPro Aches to PerForMAnce A problem with the mainstream definition of performance is its nonsubstantial na- ture. the definition of performance as outputs and outcomes of public services does not tell us what these outputs and outcomes should be. Different ideologies will have different views about public services, such as whether or not to redistribute outputs, how many services to provide, and whether or not regulation is needed. As such, the mainstream definition is a purely analytical concept. Different actors can define performance differently without invalidating its conceptual definition in terms of output and outcome (Van Dooren, bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). Operationalizing public administration performance calls for a “thick” substan- tive approach to performance that includes a variety of public values. the tendency of measurement systems to develop tunnel vision, similar to the narrow focus of credit-rating agencies, could be countered by maintaining an open conceptual view on what defines public administration performance. In a seminal article on the New Public Management (NPM), Hood (1991) proposes a classification with three clusters of public values. He makes the point that NPM reforms almost exclu – sively stress public values of one type, often to the detriment of other values. the public-values literature expanded further in the following decade. Jorgensen and bozeman (2007), for instance, developed an inventory of more than 70 different values in the public-values universe. for reasons of parsimony, Hood’s three broad value groups are utilized, since they also seem to reflect general dimensions of Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 493 performance (Van Dooren, bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). three broad but distinct substantial definitions of performance might be: • Product performance reflects success in matching resources to defined tasks. Government has to operate in an economical, efficient, and effective way. Product performance reflects what Piotrowski (2010) calls mission-based values. • Procedural performance reflects success in keeping government fair and honest. Government has to pursue honesty, fairness, and mutuality through the preven- tion of distortion, inequity, bias, and abuse of office. Procedural performance is not mission-based (Piotrowski, 2010). • Regime performance reflects success in keeping the public sector robust and resilient. Government has to operate even in adverse “worst-case” conditions and to adapt rapidly in response to crisis and change. Regime performance is another form of non-mission-based performance. It is generally easier to measure product performance than process or regime performance (see Table 1). for production, resources are allocated to defined tasks and indicators are a means to assess goal attainment. this is not to say that measurement is unproblematic, but at least conceptually it is unambiguous. Processes in production cycles are usually repeated, which allows for learning in measurement. Measuring levels of fairness and honesty becomes substantially more complicated. Such measures will predominantly be about the absence of fairness and honesty, measuring fraud, corruption, favoritism, and so forth. typi- cally, these activities are “under the radar.” they are, however, recurring events, which makes the development of indicators somewhat easier. Indicators for ro- bustness and resilience are even more complicated, since failures and worst-case conditions that really put a strain on robustness are uncommon. As an alternative to outcome measures, measures of capacity could be developed, but they are not performance indicators (Hall, 2008). the selected public administration dimensions discussed below touch upon two of the three approaches to public values. Human resources management and bud- t able 1. Approaches to Performance and consequences for development of indicators Product Procedure Regime How can performance be observed?Sufficiency (provision of services) (Mostly) deficiency (absence of fairness and honesty) Deficiency (system failure) what is the incidence of these observations? (Mostly) repeated (Mostly) repeated One-time Developing indicators feasible DifficultVery difficult Source: based on Van Dooren, bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010. 494 PPMR / March 2012 geting are typically cyclical, recurring activities. A human resources management department has to hire, evaluate, motivate, and terminate staff on a continuous basis. timely and accurate budgets have to be developed by budget departments every year. Human resources management and budgeting activities have a good deal of product performance, and hence it can be expected that measuring performance on these dimensions is viable. the main “product” of a budget department is the budget. for a human resources department, hires are an important product. Open government, on the contrary, has a more procedural, nonmission focus, and hence more difficulties can be expected in developing indicators. for regime performance, it is not at all clear whether it is possible to develop performance indicators; and in consequence this dimension is left out of the scope of the present ar ticle. Public Administration Performance the discussion in this section defines public administration performance. the development of performance indicators for public administration requires an understanding of two defining features of the nature of public administration. first, public administration is about enabling rather than delivering. Public administration almost never provides final goods and services. Public administra- tion, however, is a precondition for the successful operation of other government departments. It is government for government rather than government for the citizens. that takes nothing away from its importance. Public service delivery is a chain of inputs and outputs. clearly, public administration arrangements are to be found earlier in the chain. Schools need to be staffed and financed before they can provide teaching. the chain of impact is schematically represented in figure 1. Public admin- istration processes, including typical horizontal functions such as financing and human resources management, are a precondition for functions performed by line departments and agencies. Public administration outputs are inputs for the functional processes. for instance, ethics training sessions are an output for an ethics division but an input for a social security department. the outcome of the training sessions is better awareness of ethics issues within the administration of social security. In the same way, the number of administered allowances is an output of the social security administration that is an input for societal processes. If the allowance protects people from poverty, then it is a policy outcome. the step from a public administration process such as ethics to a policy outcome such as poverty in society is a rather big leap. It would be hard to demonstrate how integrity training has an impact on poverty statistics. However, by taking into consideration the intermediate processes in the chain, it might be possible to bridge the gap. Public administration processes should, in the first place, improve the quality of public administration and enable others to govern society in a more Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 495 direct way. Public administration performance should reflect this position. A second typical feature of public administration is its crosscutting nature. Precisely because it is an enabler, public administration has an impact on all other policy sectors. this also explains why it is so difficult to implement government- wide administrative policies (Verhoest, bouckaert, & Peters, 2007). Often, such policies are perceived to run counter to the vested interests and practices of the policy sectors. for measurement, the crosscutting nature of public administration complicates data collection and standardization. Measuring the enabling and crosscutting roles of public administration has two consequences. first, the outputs of public administration processes are the inputs for substantive processes in line departments and agencies. In order to identify output, it is necessary to ask what products and services public administration processes deliver to line agencies. Second, the outcomes of public administration primarily have to reflect its ability to facilitate policy sectors. to identify outcome, it is necessary to ask whether public administration processes succeed in enabling performance in other sectors. MeAsuring Public AdMinistrA tion PerForMAnce: b udgeting, huMAn resources MAn AgeMent, And oPen governMent the conceptual approach described above will now be applied to three important dimensions of public administration: budgeting, human resources management, and open government. Maturity of measurement differs for the three dimensions. Measurement in budgeting is quite well developed, which allows for relatively robust and comparative indicators. Human resources management is also a dimen- sion in which several measurement efforts exist, but these are not yet developed for international comparative purposes. Open government is, for measurement Figure 1. A chained Approach to outcome 496 PPMR / March 2012 concerns, a field of experimentation. Some prospects for indicator development are discussed below. the implications for their use are considered in the discus- sion and also in the conclusions. Budgeting A budget is defined as a comprehensive statement of government financial plans, including expenditures, revenues, deficit or surplus, and debt. the budget is the government’s main economic policy document, indicating how it plans to use public resources to meet policy goals (OEcD, 2006). budgeting activities follow a cycle of events or stages in making decisions about the budget, and implementing and assessing those decisions. the cycle usually has four stages: formulation, ap- proval, execution, and audit. what are the outcomes of these budgeting activities? what constitutes successful and unsuccessful budgeting? budgeting has multiple objectives (Gray, Jenkins, & Segsworth, 2001; Sterck, 2007). three conventional budget functions are authorization (legal function), al- location (policy function), and management (management function). by approving the budget, the legislature authorizes the executive to spend money and to collect taxes. the question, then, is whether budgets succeed in informing executives about the decisions they have to make. More generally, the budget has to inform the general public about government’s spending and revenue collection inten- tions. A second objective of a budget is to allocate resources to policy fields while maintaining fiscal balance at the macrolevel. the question is whether the budget is successful in allocating the right amount of resources to public services and, at the same time, is successful in ensuring a structural balance between revenues and expenditures. A third function is management. Managers have to use budgets to control their organization. Performance indicators for budgeting could first look at the variance between projected (intended) and actual revenues and the variance between projected and actual expenditures (colonna & Puma, 2003). these measures give an indication of the quality of the estimates. If the variance becomes too high, the impact of the budget as a tool for policy, management, and legislative control erodes. At the microlevel, managers may no longer be able to plan spending and investment. Moreover, overestimation of expenditures may lead to end-of-the-year spending— also known as “December fever” (Douglas & franklin, 2006; tarschys, 2002). Managers typically spend all of their appropriated budgets, partly because they fear sanctions in the subsequent budget round. At the macrolevel, economic and monetary policy will be based on faulty assumptions (Rubin, 1997). the Govern- ment Performance Project (Maxwell School of citizenship and Public Affairs, 2002) uses the following measures; a. Revenue estimation accuracy = (actual revenue – estimated revenue)/estimated revenue Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 497 b. Expenditure estimation accuracy = (actual expenditure – estimated expenditure)/ estimated expenditure Expenditures and revenues can be over- or underestimated. cautious budgeting would suggest a higher tolerance for the underestimation of revenues and the over – estimation of expenditures. A budget in the public sector is also a tool for legisla- tive control over the executive. the legislature’s appropriations provide authority under law to the executive to spend public funds up to a set limit and for a specified purpose. In this respect, a budget reflects not only a projection but also an intention (Kristensen, Groszyk, & böhler, 2002). Overestimation of expenditures implies that appropriated budgets are not used. this may be the result of bad budgeting, but may also point to implementation problems and thus an infringement on the legislature’s decision to spend a given amount on a particular program. A second set of budget performance indicators reflects budgeting transparency. blondal (2003) observes that the budget is the government’s principal policy docu- ment, wherein the government’s policy objectives are reconciled and implemented in concrete terms (i.e., the authorization function). budget transparency—openness about policy intentions, formulation, and implementation—is therefore at the core of good public administration and may even influence more general political indicators, such as voter turnout (benito & bastida, 2009). Researchers at international institutions and nonprofits, as well as a cademics, have attempted to develop indices of budget transparency that combine several indicators (Alt & lassen, 2006; De Renzio & Masud, 2011). According to blondal (2003), transparency has three essential elements. the first is the systematic and timely release of budgetary data. this is what is traditionally associated with bud- get transparency. budget transparency is seen as an output, that is, the release of budgetary data. the second element is an effective role for the legislature. It must be able to scrutinize the budget reports and independently review them. It must be able to debate and influence budget policy and be in a position to effectively hold the government to account. the third element is an effective role for civil society, through the media and nongovernmental organizations. citizens must be in a posi- tion to influence budget policy and must be in a position to hold the government to account. In many ways, it is a role similar to that of the legislature albeit only indirectly. the second and third elements discuss the roles of the legislature and society, respectively. Active scrutiny by the legislature and society may be the result of efforts to increase budget transparency, but also of characteristics of the polity or broader trends (Sterck, 2007). Fiscal stability may be a third budgeting performance indicator. As argued above, one of the key budget functions is allocation: to match spending priori- ties with estimated revenues. Many institutional arrangements contribute to this objective—fiscal rules, economic assumptions, expenditure frameworks, fiscal-risk 498 PPMR / March 2012 assessments, and so on. therefore, a balanced budget seems to be a valid indica- tor of the outcomes of these processes. there is, however, a delicate balance to maintain in practice as well as in the indicator set. Institutions for safeguarding balanced budgets, combined with the growth of entitlements and taxing limitations, can lead to an erosion of allocative efficiency (Marlowe, 2009). Audits close the budgeting cycle. they are expert examinations of legal and financial compliance or performance (Raaum & Morgan, 2001). Performance of compliance audits might, for instance, be a decrease in the number of corrections auditors have to put forward. the results of such performance measures, however, are usually hard to interpret. Does a higher number of infringements imply that auditors detect more mistakes or that they fail to help administrations to avoid mistakes? Several supreme audit offices have attempted to measure audit outcomes (for an overview, see lonsdale, wilkins, & ling, 2011). the uK National Audit Office measures the financial savings due to auditing work relative to the money invested in the auditing agency. It identified a savings of £582 million in 2007 as a result of audit work, which exceeded the 8:1 target by some £22 million (National Audit Office, 2007). the National Audit Office, however, stresses that many benefits are not financial, and thus not measured. the u.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports financial benefits of $46 billion, which is a 94:1 ratio relative to every dollar invested in audit (2007). the GAO also measures nonfinancial benefits. It measures (1) how often agencies act on GAO information to improve services to the public, (2) when information the GAO provides to the congress results in statutory or regulatory changes, and (3) when core business processes improve at agencies and government-wide management reforms are advanced by the GAO’s work. beyond this, the GAO measures the percentage of past recommendations implemented. In fiscal year 2007, 82% of the 2003 recommendations had been implemented. A final outcome indicator from the GAO report relates to client satisfaction. It counts the number of congressional hearings at which the GAO testified. the underlying argu- ment is that congressional attention is an indication of responsiveness and impact. budgeting has been subject to substantial international standardization, in particular within the European union (Eurostat, 2001; united Nations, 1993). Hence, some relatively robust international comparative-performance indicators can be derived from the budgeting system. Most Eu countries seem to follow the Eurostat guidelines, with the notable exception of Greece, which has resorted to unprecedented creative accounting. the reaction of the European union seems to be to impose more control and more intensive measurement. 5 Again, an argument pro measurement. Human Resources Management One of the most prominent public administration issues is public personnel management. the OEcD (2007) identifies four dimensions of human resources management policy: (1) workforce planning and management, (2) management of staff performance, (3) flexibility and coherence of human resources manage- Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 499 ment rules across governments, and (4) core values. the latter were discussed above in the section dealing with the guiding principles of outcome indicators. the first three dimensions are used as a point of departure for the definition of performance indicators. (1) the objective of good workforce planning and management is “to ensure an appropriately dimensioned, appropriately structured, and representative workforce, able to meet changing labor needs in the context of changing demands and rapid developments in the wider labor market” (OEcD, 2007). A number of indicators can be derived. the workforce needs to be appropriately dimensioned and structured, with the right size and education. At first sight, size and education are input indicators. Yet it is the adverb “appropriately” that gives this objective an outcome flavor. w ell-functioning human resources management arrangements should bring about a workforce that is adequately sized and educated in order to ensure undisrupted and financially sustainable service delivery. Indicators that reflect the appropriate- ness can be considered outcomes. An important outcome of successful human resources management policies in a competitive labor market is government’s being an employer of choice (Vandenabeele, 2008). A 2002 OE cD study assessed this issue by asking whether governments expect problems in recruitment and retention—now or soon. the study also asked whether there are critical skill shortages (OE cD, 2002). Duration of hiring is another potential indicator of workforce management. t he u.S. Office of Personnel Management used this indicator to assess the human resources management performance of government agencies (2007). It defines the indicator as the agency’s percentage of hires within a 45-day timeframe. It uses a hiring time-frame model to uniformly define the indicator. the u.S. GAO uses hire rate and acceptance rate to assess the impact of hu- man resources management practices. the hire rate is the ratio of the number of people hired to the number the agency planned to hire as defined in its workforce plan. the acceptance rate is the ratio of the number of applicants accepting of- fers to the number of offers made. Acceptance rate is seen as a proxy for GAO’s attractiveness as an employer and an indicator of competitiveness in bringing in new talent (GAO, 2007). Many governments strive for a workforce that reflects society (Gualmini, 2008). Evidence of the impact of diversity on performance efficiency is diffuse (Andrews, boyne, Meier, O’ toole, & walker, 2005), but representation also reflects other public values, such as social mobility of minorities. Indicators on equal opportunities reflecting the gender balance and minority representation are thus potential outcome indicators. (2) the objective of good staff performance management is “to ensure a suitably empowered and highly motivated civil service that is flexible and collaborative 500 PPMR / March 2012 and provides services in a cost efficient manner” (OEcD, 2007). this outcome suggests a second set of performance indicators. first, consider staff satisfac- tion. A satisfied workforce could be seen as an outcome for a human resources department. Sick leave/absenteeism is another example. A reasonable measure of successful human resources management is a low absenteeism rate. External factors that need to be taken into account might include the age structure of the workforce (younger people are healthier) and the task environment (idea-based and relational tasks are probably less exhausting and more motivating than routine physical jobs) (Hackman & Oldham, 1980). A third example may be indicators on retention and turnover. Organizations invest in hiring and training people, and thus presumably want to retain them. High retention rates may reflect workplace attractiveness. clearly, an important external influence will be the condition of the general labor market and the resulting degree of private-sector competition for critical skills. (3) the objective of a good balance between human resources management arrangements is “to ensure that transaction costs in negotiating shared responsi- bilities between governments are minimized, and that an active labor market is supported for staff with distinctive public sector skills and competencies” (OE cD, 2007). A third set of indicators is implied in this outcome. An active labor market is related to workforce mobility. first, there may be a learning effect. Mobility broadens horizons, leads to the circulation of ideas, and in this way is an antidote against tunnel vision. Second, mobility is in some instances a strategy against cor – ruption and unethical behavior, especially in inspection services. the time spent in a particular sensitive position is too short to develop unsound relations with target groups (Abbink, 2004). third, mobility may be a matter of allocation. Some departments may have staff shortages while others have redundancies. Internal labor markets should sort out these imbalances. the kinds of indicators in this field are typically found in many larger orga- nizations, both private companies and public bureaucracies. Hence, there seems to be fertile ground for solid international and cross-sectoral comparison. the main problem for comparative purposes is that, unlike for budgeting, there are no internationally agreed upon standards and definitions. Open Government A third field of public administration to be highlighted as a case of comparative measurement concerns the openness of government. Open government mostly re- lates to procedural performance, and therefore performance measurement becomes more difficult. It is a field characterized by measurement experimentation. the OEcD identifies four dimensions of accountability and openness (OEcD, 2001). Transparency is the ability of the government to ensure that its actions, and those who are responsible for its actions, are exposed to public scrutiny and Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 501 challenge. Accessibility in the public sector is achieved when the government can ensure everyone’s capacity to obtain information and to utilize services at any time, anywhere, and in a user-friendly manner. A responsive government is one that can and will react to new ideas, demands, and needs of citizens. Inclusiveness aims to ensure the broadest base of participation possible. the four dimensions of openness and accountability are assumed to build on each other (see Figure 2). transparent government is a precondition for accessible government. citizens need to know their government in order to access it, and citizens need to access government in order for government to respond to them. Inclusiveness seems to be a different dimension, which assesses to what extent government is transparent for everyone, accessible for everyone, and responsive to everyone. the underlying logic of this scheme resembles Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969): the higher on the ladder, the higher the level of participation. In this model, it can be argued, open and accountable governments are at the top of the pyramid. Transparency is a key tenet of contemporary performance and accountability relations (Dubnick, 2005; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002). freedom of in- formation laws are a key institutional arrangement for achieving transparency. Performance indicators might reflect whether citizens (and companies and media) actually refer to these laws or whether they remain dead letters. the catch is that in very transparent public administration systems, there is no need to use information laws. Interpretation of performance information in context and through dialogue seems warranted (Moynihan, 2008). the publication of annual reports, performance data, strategic plans, and legis- lative timetables is a means of opening up government activity to the public eye. Performance indicators could measure the extent to which target groups are actually using available information. A good definition of target groups is necessary. It is not realistic to expect ordinary citizens to read annual reports and strategic plans in their leisure time. It is realistic, however, to expect media and interest groups to Tr an sparen t gove rnme nt Acce ssible gove rnme nt Respon sive gove rnme nt Inclus ive gov ernm ent Figure 2. open and Accountable government: Four dimensions 502 PPMR / March 2012 scrutinize public documents. 6 these mediators play a crucial role in safeguarding transparency in democratic societies. Expert assessments are likely to be a good way to proceed in measuring the quality of these reports. Accessibility. countries mainly safeguard accessibility through administrative law, but ombudsmen, citizen or service charters, and policies to reduce red tape also have accessibility as an objective. It is very difficult to measure the direct impact of these arrangements. Is the number of complaints handled by the ombudsman an indication of problems with accessibility, or does it simply mean the ombudsman is better known? A more general indication of accessibility problems may be the length of the waiting list for services. the problem of this indicator is that waiting lists usually cannot be attributed to open government policies. Although the latter may help to put the issue on the agenda, waiting lists are more likely caused by lack of capacity or extraordinary demands on a service. Responsiveness is pursued through public consultation or active public par – ticipation throughout the policymaking process. According to several authors, responsiveness should be more than a mere client orientation. they stress the importance of citizen-government collaboration (Vigoda, 2002) and coproduction ( b ovaird, 2007), which reflect the quality and depth of the relationship rather than the power or the number of participants. Measuring the performance of partici- pation processes is thus a delicate matter. One possible indicator could measure the range of backgrounds and personal profiles of the participants. In an optimal scenario, participation is widespread and representative, but again, the interpreta- tion of the results is not straightforward. to conclude, the performance of arrangements aimed at an open and account- able government is especially hard to measure. Outcomes can only be observed within society—using public opinion data from citizens, businesses, and privileged observers such as interest groups. these data are perceptual and nonstandardized. the standardized surveys that do exist, such as Eurobarometer and the world Values Survey, often face the problem of translating core concepts such as legitimacy and trust (MacQuarrie, 2008). the fallback option is to measure citizens’ use of open government arrangements under the premise that arrangements need to be used in order to be effective. Here, international comparison is plagued by differences in the institutional framework that arranges access to government. discussion and conclusion the present article began with the observation that the economic crisis is also a crisis of measurement in the ratings industry. Yet ratings are unlikely to disappear. More generally, measurement seems to be a key tenet of modern society (Porter, 1995; Scott, 1998). Performance indicators are increasingly used to make complex realities tangible and to hold actors accountable. the vast array of activities and performance Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 503 in hospitals, schools, universities, local governments, and the like are captured by a limited number of indicators in performance contracts, league tables, and star ratings (bevan & Hood, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Radin, 2006). the story of the rating agencies also shows that the impact of these indicator regimes can be substantial. In order to ensure that accountability for performance is providing the right effects in government and society, the quality and diversity of indicators becomes crucial. this is also the case for public administration indicators. the quality of public administration indicators is often problematic, in particular when they are internation- ally comparative. Nonetheless, they are increasingly used, among other purposes, to inform funding, investment decisions, the rating of government bonds, and media coverage (united Nations Development Programme, 2004). As a result, the develop- ment of diverse and valid comparative indicators seems to be warranted. this article builds on OEcD initiatives with a conceptual discussion of indicators in the fields of budgeting, human resources management, and open government. the cases show that public administration performance measurement is at least conceptually conceivable for all three fields. there are differences between the cases, however. for budgeting, good comparative performance indicators can be developed. the high level of standardization and cyclical nature of budgeting contributes to the potential. f or human resources management, the development of performance indicators is also relatively straightforward, but international comparison may be more difficult due to the lack of standardization. for open T X D O L W R I P H D V X U H P H Q W X V H K L J K O R Z K L J K O R Z E X G J H W L Q J R S H Q J R Y + 5 0 F U H G L W U D W L Q J V J R Y H U Q D Q F H L Q G L F D W R U V Figure 3. Measurement Quality and use 504 PPMR / March 2012 government, the procedural character seems to be a hindrance to the development and interpretation of indicators. for all three fields, performance indicators will only make sense in context, suggesting that there is need for dialogue on indica- tors (Moynihan, 2008). Accountability for performance should not be confined to accountability for performance indicators. the article mainly deals with the validity and robustness of international compari- sons of public administration. Yet, as is argued above, the use of performance indicators is an equally important dimension. Although use was not the main object of the article, it ends with some reflections on how measurement quality and use may interact. figure 3 combines measurement quality and its use and gives a rough assessment of where to locate the cases of budgeting, human resources management, and open government. It also plots the general governance indicators (for an overview, see Van de walle, 2006) and the credit ratings of cDOs that sparked the economic crisis. International comparative data on open government and human resources man- agement tend to be of relatively low quality (somewhat better on quality for human resources management). this, however, is not problematic, because the low intensity of use leaves room for experimentation. budgeting has higher quality, but international comparisons of budget data are used quite intensively by international institutions. the case of low use and high quality is mainly a missed opportunity. the most problematic quadrant is high use of low-quality data. the credit ratings clearly were to be situated in this category, and several governance indicators also seem to head this way. use and quality of data are intertwined. Once data are used intensively and have an impact, they become institutionalized. At that point, it becomes difficult to improve quality, because changes in definitions and methods also touch upon interests and challenge routines. Efforts to alter GDP calculations—another inten- sively used indicator—are a case in point (Van Dooren, 2009). In other words, it is very difficult to move upward from the lower-right quadrant in figure 3. Another implication is that being in the lower-left quadrant should be cherished. this is the period in which the DNA of the performance indicators can be established through experimentation. for indicators of public administration performance, there is still room for experimentation. finally, the admittedly rough analysis of the quadrants may call for more longitudinal research on how indicator sets are developed over time, how invalid data are able to construct a reality, what determines the use of valid data, and where the indicator sets originate. notes 1. the Obama administration has been very critical of the quality of Standard & Poor’s ratings since the u.S. downgrade (“President Obama’s statement,” 2011). In the media, there have been some less critical accounts of the role of rating agencies (e.g., tasker, 2011), together with more critical and very critical perspectives (e.g., “credit-rating agencies,” 2011; Rushe, 2011). 2. the views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect any opinion of the OEcD or its member governments. Van Dooren, De caluwé, and lonti / MEASuRING PublIc ADMINIStRAtION PERfORMANcE 505 3. A free rider is someone who enjoys the benefits of a public good without bearing the cost. the image of someone who uses public transport without paying is illustra tive. 4. 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Van Dooren, w., bouckaert, G., & Halligan, J. (2010). Performance management in the public sector. london: Routledge. Verhoest, K., bouckaert, G., & Peters, b.G. (2007). Janus-faced reorganization: Specializa- tion and coordination in four OEcD countries in the period 1980–2005. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 73(3), 325. 508 PPMR / March 2012 Vigoda, E. (2002). from responsiveness to collaboration: Governance, citizens, and the next generation of public administration. Public Administration Review, 62(5), 527–540. Wouter Van Dooren is an assistant professor of public administration in the Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp, Belgium. He researches performance measurement and management and recently coauthored Performance Management in the Public Sector (Routledge, 2010). Chiara De Caluwé is a researcher in the Department of Political Science, Uni- versity of Antwerp, Belgium. 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CASE STUDY: HUMAN RESOURCES ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS OVERVIEW In this Case Study, you will apply the Statesmanship model discussed in Module 1: Week 1 to a real, specific public administration context
360 Public Administration Review • May | June 2021 Public Administration Review , Vol. 81, Iss. 3, pp. 360. © 2021 by The American Society for Public Administration. DOI: 10.1111/puar.13386. American Society for Public Administration Code of Ethics T he American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) advances the science, art, and practice of public administration. The Society affirms its responsibility to develop the spirit of responsible professionalism within its membership and to increase awareness and commitment to ethical principles and standards among all those who work in public service in all sectors. To this end, we, the members of the Society, commit ourselves to uphold the following principles: 1. Advance the Public Interest. Promote the interests of the public and put service to the public above service to oneself. 2. Uphold the Constitution and the Law. Respect and support government constitu – tions and laws, while seeking to improve laws and policies to promote the public good. 3. Promote Democratic Participation. Inform the public and encourage active engagement in governance. Be open, transparent and responsive, and respect and assist all persons in their dealings with public organizations. 4. Strengthen Social Equity. Treat all persons with fairness, justice, and equality and respect individual differences, rights, and freedoms. Promote affirmative action and other initiatives to reduce unfairness, injustice, and inequality in society. 5. Fully Inform and Advise. Provide accurate, honest, comprehensive, and timely informa – tion and advice to elected and appointed officials and governing board members, and to staff members in your organization. 6. Demonstrate Personal Integrity. Adhere to the highest standards of conduct to inspire public confidence and trust in public service. 7. Promote Ethical Organizations. Strive to attain the highest standards of ethics, steward – ship, and public service in organizations that serve the public. 8. Advance Professional Excellence. Strengthen personal capabilities to act competently and ethically and encourage the professional development of others. Approved by the ASPA National Council March 16, 2013, along with Practices for carrying out the Code available at www.aspanet.org/CodeofEthics . In 2014, the Ethics and Standards Implementation Committee was created to advance awareness of ethics in public service, provide advice and assistance to members in handling ethical problems, and review and seek to resolve ethics complaints regarding members who may have violated the Code.

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