Article critique

Stuck with a difficult assignment? No time to get your paper done? Feeling confused? If you’re looking for reliable and timely help for assignments, you’ve come to the right place. We promise 100% original, plagiarism-free papers custom-written for you. Yes, we write every assignment from scratch and it’s solely custom-made for you.

Order a Similar Paper Order a Different Paper

attached is the article the critique has to be done on and the instructions. Thanks so much  ! 


Your paper should

-be two to three pages in length, double-spaced,

-begin with a correct and full APA-6 citation for the journal article,

-have 1″ margins all the way around,

-be typed in a 12-point standard font like Arial or Times New Roman,

-be otherwise generally formatted in the writing style of the APA (6th edition of the style guide), and

-be generally well-written and formal

In general, an article critique should be written clearly enough that someone who has never read the article can follow the logic of what the researchers did.

Some of the topics your paper should cover (this is not necessarily an exhaustive list):

Discuss the topic, theory, and hypotheses being tested in the article you’ve read.

Identify all IVs and DVs, and describe how they were operationally defined.

Describe the results of the research and the authors’ interpretations.

Point out potential flaws, things you would have done differently, questions still unanswered, etc.

This last part is the most important, because this is the “critiquing” portion of the assignment, and you are being asked for a reaction to this work. Do not assume that since this is published that it is perfect – it’s not. Tell me what you think is wrong, but make sure to back it up. Why is it wrong? What would you have done differently?

Be careful not to give me your opinions about the authors’ choice of research topic, etc. Even if you are not interested in the topic, they are. Everything that you’ve learned about research design and quality issues should bear on your evaluations of this research. Don’t criticize or praise the work without backing up what you say using what you’ve learned.

Developmental Psychology
1992, Vol. 28, No. 2, 205-214

Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
y 0012-1649/92/^3.00

John Dewey and Human Development

Emily D. Cahan
Division of Continuing Education

Harvard University

John Dewey (1859-1952) was an American philosopher-psychologist of international acclaim.
Although he did not greatly influence early American psychology, Dewey’s relevance to contempo-
rary psychology is manifold. He identified the problem of social psychology as the relationship
between human nature and changing social circumstances, proposed means and a rationale to
broaden the empiricism of psychology to encompass domains outside of the traditional laboratory
setting, suggested that functional rather than structural characteristics differentiate childish from
adult reasoning, and proposed a theory of noninevitable child development in which social values
and practices play essential roles. Dewey proposed that by elucidating mechanisms for realizing
desired values psychology can be an empirically based instrument for promoting human develop-
ment and social progress in a democratic society.

John Dewey was born on October 20,1859, in Burlington,
Vermont, the third of four sons born to a merchant father and a
devout mother. Charles Darwin had just published The Origin
of Species, and James Buchanan was president. Dewey died in
his apartment on Fifth Avenue in New brk City in June 1952,
when Dwight David Eisenhower was securing the presidency.
Dewey grew up amidst Burlington’s traditional democratic
community, surrounded by the Green Mountains. He spent
most of his mature years in the impersonal urban complexities
of Chicago and New York.

Dewey’s steady stream of major works began with the 1887
publication Psychology and ended with the 1949 publication
with Arthur Bentley of Knowing and the Known. During his
long life, the United States transformed itself from a country of
small farms to a nation of sprawling cities and factories. The
changes that Dewey witnessed in his journeys from Vermont
through the Midwest and to New York reflected a wider set of
changes in American life, and Dewey devoted much of his life
to insisting that philosophy, psychology, and education should
respond in kind. Dewey took especially seriously the cultural
change in the role of science in American life. During Dewey’s
life, scientific inquiry had emerged from a study engaged in by
a small elite to a requirement of all educated persons. For 50
years Dewey “persistently worked to transform the scientific
method of knowledge into an instrument of individual moral
guidance and enlightened social planning” (Rockefeller, 1991,
p. 3). In science lay the possibility of rationally reconstructing
our social institutions. In such reconstructions lay the promise
of a fuller and freer life. Dewey’s ideal society bears a close
relationship to his psychology. Dewey felt that a society gov-
erned jointly by the epistemological norms of science (taken
broadly to mean rational inquiry, not a technical set of proce-
dures) and the political norms of democracy held the most

Emily D. Cahan is grateful to William Kessen and Sheldon White for
our many conversations about John Dewey and related matters.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Emily D. Cahan, Division of Continuing Education, Harvard Univer-
sity, 51 Brattle Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

promise for individual growth and freedom. Optimal human
development required a society ordered on the basis of rational-
ity and democracy. Dewey wrestled most explicitly with the
question of development in children in his pedagogical writ-
ings. Education was Dewey’s most enduring, comprehensive,
and synthetic philosophical problem and the one for which he
became best known. His interest in education “fused with and
brought together what might otherwise have been separate inter-
ests—that in psychology and that in social institutions and so-
cial life” (Dewey, 1930, p. 156).

In 1875, just short of 16 years of age, Dewey entered the
University of Vermont, New England’s fifth oldest college, and
acquired a taste for philosophy from Professor H. A. P. Torrey.
After graduating, Dewey taught high school, first in Oil City,
Pennsylvania, and then back in Vermont. While in Oil City,
Dewey submitted an article entitled “The Metaphysical As-
sumptions of Materialism” to W T. Harris, the editor of the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy and a prominent American
Hegelian. Harris accepted for publication the article from this
shy young man who felt uncertain of his abilities and commit-
ments. Encouraged by Morris and Torrey, and having obtained
a loan from an aunt, Dewey attended graduate school at Johns
Hopkins University. There he “listened to Charles Pierce but
did not come under his direct influence” (Hook, 1939, p. 12),
took courses on the new experimental psychology from G.
Stanley Hall, and deepened his interest and early inclination
toward idealist philosophy. Hall warned his students of the
dangers of excessive idealism and “from his studies with Hall
and such admonitions” (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 90) Dewey be-
came more conscious of his own “inclination toward the sche-
matic and formally logical” (Dewey, 1930, p. 150) and his ten-
dency to “give way to the dialectical development of a theme”
(Dewey, 1930, p. 150). Hall helped him to recognize the need to
“balance” (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 90) this “formal, theoretic inter-
est” with careful attention to “the concrete, empirical, and
‘practical'” (Dewey, 1930, p. 151). In the short turn, however,
the idealistic lessons of George S. Morris captivated Dewey
more than the warnings of Hall.

Neo-Hegelianism seemed, at least in his early years as a bud-



ding philosopher, to satisfy Dewey’s personal craving for a
philosophical system in which parts related to a whole in a
manner consistent with the new evolutionary biology with its
emphasis on the organism in interaction with the environment.
Slowly, unevenly, and over the course of many decades, Dewey
turned from a philosophy based on objective Mind to a philo-
sophy based on experience. Dewey admitted that Hegel “left a
permanent deposit in my thinking” (Dewey, 1930, p. 154) but
claimed that in his later years, he found that “the form, the
schematicism of Hegel’s system” seemed “artificial to the last
degree” (Dewey, 1930, p. 154). Professionally, Dewey developed
his philosophy at the Universities of Michigan, Minnesota, and
Chicago and brought his thought to “rounded completion”
(Hook, 1939, p. 5) at Columbia University. Always an activist
though never an agitator, Dewey’s pen never “ceased its flow of
comment on public issues of the day” (Scheffler, 1974, p. 187).
At the height of his career in the early decades of this century,
Dewey exerted a major influence on American culture as well
as having an impact overseas (Rockefeller, 1991). He was a man
of affairs, and his most enduring influences were to be in educa-
tion and philosophy. He wrote quietly but wisely about the “new
psychology” that was so quickly taking form.

This article will abstract from Dewey’s enormous corpus his
views on the meaning and nature of a psychology of human
development. The article begins with Dewey’s early commit-
ment to idealistic philosophy, makes a turn with his discovery
of social psychology, and proceeds to Dewey’s “consummate”
interest in education. Dewey’s educational writings reveal a
theory of development that leans less on nature than the writ-
ings of many of his contemporary developmentalists and more
on culture in ways we now associate with the later discovered
writings of Lev S. Vygotsky. In essence, Dewey’s idea of develop-
ment is one of noninevitable progress toward ends that depend
deeply and essentially on social practices and values. Psychol-
ogy provides a means for realizing those values and in so doing
promoting human growth and social progress. Finally, Dewey’s
commitment to empirical inquiry informs his ideas of develop-
ment no less than it permeates his entire pragmatic philosophy.

From Philosophy to Social Psychology

In the 1880s and 1890s, the new psychology began to estab-
lish itself in American universities. The sine qua non of this
new psychology lay in laboratory-based investigations of ele-
mentary problems of sensation and perception. Dewey had a
much broader vision for the new psychology. For Dewey, this
new psychology was made possible by two great intellectual
achievements: one in biology, the other in the social and histori-
cal sciences. In his eloquent 1884 article entitled “The New
Psychology,” Dewey reviews these influences. From biology
and Darwin come the concept of organism in environment;
from the human sciences come a method of observing active
minds in cultural settings. Together, these influences constitute
the basis of a social psychology from which developmental psy-
chology cannot be separated. There are casualties along the way
from the old to the new, including the method of introspection
and the psychology of ready-made faculties. But there are new
promises and possibilities as well, including a truly social psy-
chology that would consider people in relationship to their so-
cial circumstances.

To biology is due the conception of organism…. In psychology
this conception has led to the recognition of mental life as an
organic unitary process developing according to the laws of all
life, and not a theatre for the exhibition of independent autono-
mous faculties, or a rendezvous in which isolated, atomic sensa-
tions and ideas may gather, hold external converse, and then for-
ever part. Along with this recognition of the solidarity of mental
life has come that of the relation in which it stands to other lives
organized in society. The idea of environment is a necessity to the
idea of organism, and with the conception of environment comes
the impossibility of considering psychic life as an individual, iso-
lated thing developing in a vacuum. (Dewey, 1884, p. 56)

The individual is born into an “organized social life. . . from
which he draws his mental and spiritual substance” and in
which he must “perform his proper function or become a men-
tal and moral wreck” (Dewey, 1884, p. 57). We need new meth-
ods, however, for studying people in relation to organized social
life—for studying mind in culture. Dewey here turns to the
social and historical sciences.

I refer to the growth of those vast and as yet undefined topics of
inquiry which may be vaguely designated as the social and histori-
cal sciences—the sciences of the origin and development of the
various spheres of man’s activity. (Dewey, 1884, p. 57)

These sciences provide a method—objective observation—and
thus contain the promise of widening the scope of existing ex-
perimental psychology.

With the development of these sciences has come the general feel-
ing that the scope of psychology has been cabined and cramped
till it has lost all real vitality, and there is now the recognition of
the fact that all these sciences possess their psychological sides,
present psychological material, and demand treatment and expla-
nation at the hands of psychology. Thus the material for the latter,
as well as its scope, have been indefinitely extended. (Dewey, 1884,
p. 57)

In an era when psychology was becoming narrowly defined as a
laboratory-based enterprise, Dewey claimed that “folk-lore and
primitive culture, ethnology and anthropology, all render their
contributions of matter and press upon us the necessity of expla-
nation” (Dewey, 1884, p. 57). Dewey concludes that he “could go
through the various spheres of human activity, and point out
how thoroughly they are permeated with psychological ques-
tions and materials” (Dewey, 1884, p. 57).

The young Dewey believed in an identity of method in philo-
sophy and psychology, and he wrote his 1887 textbook with the
dual purpose of presenting the findings of the new scientific
psychology and of providing an introduction to philosophy. His
Psychology reviewed an extraordinary amount of the normal
science that had accumulated in the new psychology and assimi-
lated it to a Hegelian scheme. Because the fundamental charac-
teristic of the self is consciousness, psychology may also be
called the science of consciousness. The person is a self-deter-
mining will. He or she explores self-realization by studying the
way in which knowing, feeling, and willing contribute to the
unification of the self with the ideal self and to an overcoming
of the separation of subject and object, individual and universal
(Rockefeller, 1991, p. 100). “In other words, the Psychology is a
study of the way in which the self finds its true self and union
with the divine in and through science, philosophy, art, social
relations, and religion” (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 101). The book s
“young Dewey’s major defense of the world view of ethical


idealism” (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 101). The text earned praise
from some (e.g., Morris) and drew criticism from others (e.g., G.
Stanley Hall and William James).

For present purposes it is important to understand that the
“resultant advice” of Dewey’s text “for the psychologist who
wishes to understand the human mind is to go out and watch its
results in a cultural setting” (White, 1943/1964, p. 58). Dewey
was beginning his call for a social psychology of mind in experi-
ence. It would be wrong, Dewey articulated some years later, for
psychology to model its methods after the methods of the natu-
ral sciences. The most interesting aspects of social science are
just those aspects of experience that get stripped away in the
traditional natural sciences laboratory setting.

It would require a technical s u r v e y . . . to prove that the existing
limitations of’social science’ are due mainly to unreasoning devo-
tion to physical science as a model, and to a misconception of
physical science at that. Without making any such survey, atten-
tion may be directly called to one outstanding difference between
physical and social facts. The ideal of the knowledge dealing with
the former is the elimination of all factors dependent upon dis-
tinctively human response. ‘Fact,’ physically speaking, is the ulti-
mate residue after human purposes, desires, emotions, and ideas
and ideals have been systematically excluded. A social ‘fact,’ on
the other hand, is a concretion in external form of precisely these
human factors. (Dewey, 1931b, p. 64)

The Need for a Social Psychology

In a 1917 address before the American Psychological Associa-
tion, Dewey called for two psychologies—one biological and
the other social. Dewey credits the French sociologist Gabriel
Tarde for a most fruitful psychological conception that was
“ahead of his time and went almost unnoticed” (Dewey, 1917, p.
54). Tarde’s notion

was that all psychological phenomena can be divided into the
physiological and the social, and that when we have relegated ele-
mentary sensation and appetite to the former head, then all that is
left of our mental life, our beliefs, ideas and desires, falls within
the scope of social psychology. (Dewey, 1917, p. 54)

Now Dewey poses the fundamental problem of social psychol-
ogy of which child development is a part. The problem is to
understand the relation between universal aspects of human
nature and its different forms of expression in different social
circumstances or arrangements. In so stating the problem,
Dewey raises the further problems of education and social re-
form. Dewey credits his colleague from the University of Chi-
cago, W I. Thomas, for suggesting the approach.

On the one hand our problem is to know the modifications
wrought in the native constitution of man by the fact that the
elements of his endowment operate in this or that social medium;
on the other hand, we want to know how control of the environ-
ment may be better secured by means of the operation of this or
that native capacity. Under these general heads are summed up the
infinity of special and difficult problems relating to education on
the one hand and to constructive modification of our social insti-
tutions on the other. To form a mind out of certain native instincts
by selecting an environment which evokes them and directs their
course; to re-form social institutions by breaking up habits and
giving peculiar intensity and scope to some impulse is the prob-
lem of social control in its two phases. To describe how such

changes take place is the task of social psychology stated in gener-
alized terms. (Dewey, 1917, p. 56)

Neither Dewey nor Tarde nor Thomas was alone or first to
propose two psychologies (Cahan & White, 1992). Like John
Stuart Mill in England, Auguste Comte in France, Hugo
Munsterberg in the United States, Lev S. Vygotsky in Russia,
and others elsewhere, Dewey called for a social psychology of
people in relation to circumstances to stand beside and com-
plement the first, experimental psychology. Each version of the
second psychology would serve a strategic purpose in the de-
sign of society (Gay, 1969). Dewey’s emerging social and devel-
opmental psychology was indeed a strategic inquiry. The pur-
pose of social psychology is to aid in the reconstruction of the
institutions of social life by understanding individuals in rela-
tion to their social settings. The place, therefore, to study the
psychology of the child is in the social circumstances of the
child. In complex societies such as our own, that place is school.
To consider schools as proper places for understanding child
development, however, one must modify or extend the tradi-
tional definition of a laboratory.

Schools as L a b o r a t o r i e s o f H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t

While boasting of the methodological promises of an empiri-
cal psychology, Dewey warned against the excesses and indi-
cated the limits to the knowledge gathered in those laborato-
ries. In contemporary terms, Dewey warned of the threats to
ecological validity of a psychology that was limited to the tradi-
tional laboratory experiment.

The great advantage of the psychological laboratory is paid for by
certain obvious defects. The completer the control of conditions,
with resulting greater accuracy of determination, demands an iso-
lation, a ruling out of the usual media of thought and action,
which leads to a certain remoteness, and easily to a certain artifi-
ciality. . . . Unless our laboratory results are to give us artificiali-
ties, mere scientific curiosities, they must be subjected to interpre-
tation by gradual approximation to conditions of life.. . . The
laboratory, in a word, affords no final refuge that enables us to
avoid the ordinary scientific difficulties of forming hypotheses,
interpreting results, etc. In some sense (from the very accuracy and
limitations of its results) it adds to our responsibilities in this direc-
tion. (Dewey, 1899a, p. 145)

More recently, Dewey’s critique of a psychology limited to the
empiricism of a traditional laboratory has surfaced perhaps
most forcefully in Urie Bronfenbrenner’s proposals for an ecol-
ogy of human development (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979).

In 1896, Dewey began a small primary school under the au-
spices of the University of Chicago Department of Pedagogy.
He called the school a “laboratory school” and used it as the
source for his normal science. The time was growing ripe, De-
wey felt, for scientific experimentation in education. Dewey
called for a more

coherent philosophy of experience and a philosophy of the rela-
tion of school studies to that experience; that we can accordingly
take up steadily and wisely the effort of changing school condi-
tions so as to make real the aims that command the assent of our
intelligence and the support of our moral enthusiasm. (Dewey,
1901, p. 282)

The time was ripe, Dewey thought, to control aspects of the
school environment in such a way as to make real the ends that


we wish to foster in children. Dewey’s new school was to be a
genuine laboratory where hypotheses could be tested under
reasonably controlled conditions, a place where inquiry or expe-
rience could be directed. In ways that most certainly echo
Dewey, Donald T. Campbell has argued that psychologists
should consider social reforms as experiments (Campbell,
1969). For Dewey, the laboratory school “bears the same rela-
tion to the work in pedagogy that a laboratory bears to biology,
physics, or chemistry” (Dewey, 1896c, p. 437).

Now the school, for psychological purposes, stands in many re-
spects midway between the extreme simplifications of the labora-
tory and the confused complexities of ordinary life. Its conditions
are those of life at large; they are social and practical. But it ap-
proaches the laboratory in so far as the ends aimed at are reduced
in number, are definite, and thus simplify the conditions; and
their psychological phase is uppermost—the formation of habits
of attention, observation, memory, etc.—while in ordinary life
these are secondary and swallowed up. (Dewey, 1899a, p. 145)

The school, he said, serves educators as

a focus to keep the theoretical work in touch with the demands of
practice, and also makes an experimental station for the testing
and development of methods which, when elaborated, may be
safely and strongly recommended to other schools. (Dewey, 1896a,
p. 244)

By such means, “psychology becomes a working hypothesis,
instruction is the experimental test and demonstration of the
hypothesis; the result is both greater practical control and con-
tinued growth in theory” (Dewey, 1899a, p. 146).

The school was an experiment—an experiment in the possi-
bilities of human development in arranged environments. If we
vary aspects of this simplified social environment, we can bet-
ter understand and direct child development toward desired
ends. The school thus served Dewey as a laboratory for explor-
ing the possibilities between children, teachers, and curricula.
An analysis of the “Deweyan” classroom becomes relevant to
an understanding of child development because it is conceived
and constructed to simulate the conditions under which the
epistemological and political ideals of a democratic society are
best learned and practiced. In this analysis, the classroom be-
comes the context in which Dewey’s ideals for society are ex-
pressed as desirable norms of growth for the individual child.
The work of Dewey’s school proceeded on the basis of a set of
ideas about the nature of experience, inquiry, and child develop-
ment that are well worth exploring.

Experience, Inquiry, and the Development of Reason

Dewey’s 1896 article, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychol-
ogy,” is widely recognized as an early and important expression
of his functional psychology. The article begins with a critique
of the way in which the idea of the reflex arc had become “an
organizing principle to hold together the multiplicity of feet” in
psychology (Dewey, 1896b, p. 96). Dewey rejects the notion that
stimulus and response represent separate, unrelated entities
and insists instead that they are functionally related to each
other through purposeful activity. Dewey wants to see sensory
stimulus, central connections, and motor responses not as “sep-
arate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of

labor, functioning facts, within the single concrete whole”
(Dewey, 1896b, p. 97).

The real beginning of this sequence for Dewey is with the act
of seeing, not the bare sensation of light as a stimulus to grasp as
a response. Instead of a simple reflex arc in which light acts as a
stimulus to grasp, we have a circuit because “the motor re-
sponse determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory stimu-
lus determines movement” (Dewey, 1896b, p. 102). Both the
stimulus of light and the response of grasping must be defined
by the context of child seeing a burning candle. Stimulus and
response define each other and are therefore not “distinctions
of existence, but teleological distinctions, that is, distinctions
of function, or part played, with reference to reaching or main-
taining an end” (Dewey, 1896b, p. 104). Distinctions of stimulus
and response are functional phases of a circuit of purposeful

Dewey’s analysis of the reflex arc concept proved to be piv-
otal to his emerging experimental logic and theory of inquiry. It
foreshadows his philosophy of experience and his eventual “ex-
plicit identification of the stimulus with the problematic situa-
tion” (Smith, 1983, p. 121). For Dewey, thought “is not self-con-
tained but has a function to perform in relation to the environ-
ment, and that function is the clue to its nature” (Smith, 1983, p.
124). Specifically, the function of thought is to resolve the rela-
tionship between doubt and inquiry to attain a state of assured-
ness or certainty (Dewey, 1900,1903,1909). And a theory of
thinking demands for Dewey “a statement in which all the dis-
tinctions and terms of thought. . . shall be interpreted simply
and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within
the doubt- inquiry process” (Dewey, 1900, p. 174.).

Thinking is thus synonymous with inquiry. Thought is a pro-
cess through which doubt is subjected to inquiry and, if success-
ful, eventually gives way to assurance—a kind of temporary
equilibrium known as knowledge. This relationship between
doubt and inquiry passes through distinctive stages. Dewey’s
discussion of these stages is rough and unsystematic. In ways
that differ only subtly, Dewey discusses stages in inquiry in
several works including his early (1903) Studies in Logical
Theory as well as his more mature statement in Logic: A Theory
of Inquiry (1938a), his synthetic work on the philosophy of edu-
cation, Democracy and Education (1916); his psychological
treatise written for teachers, How We Think (1909); and some
smaller pieces more directly addressed to the development of
reasoning in children (1900,1913).

Dewey is interested in discerning the ways in which one
learns to relate facts and ideas, to consider facts as evidence in
relation to ideas. Roughly, the stages represent a progression
from a period in which ideas are fixed, when “facts and rela-
tions are taken for granted” (Dewey, 1903, p. 307); to a recogni-
tion of a problem accompanied by an unsystematic “period
of occupation with relatively crude and unorganized facts”
(Dewey, 1903, p. 307); to a speculative stage of guessing and
making hypotheses; to, finally, a period that we may identify
with scientific rationality. The end in the development of in-
quiry is

a period when observation is determined by experimental condi-
tions depending upon the use of certain guiding conceptions;
when reflection is directed and checked at every point by the use
of experimental data, and by the necessity of finding such a form
for itself as will enable it to serve in a deduction leading to evolu-


tion of new meanings, and ultimately to experimental inquiry
which brings to light new facts. (Dewey, 1903, p. 307)

Clearly, the end of this process for Dewey as “a period of fruitful
interaction between ideas and facts” (Baker, 1955, p. 39) is that
which we associate with scientific method. The process, how-
ever, does not result in any kind of stable truth. Rather, the
course of inquiry leads only to new problems:

There is no such thing as a final settlement, because every settle-
ment introduces the conditions of some degree of a new unset-
tling. In the stage of development marked by the emergence of
science, deliberate institution of problems becomes an objective
inquiry. (Dewey, 1938a, p. 42)

The world is no longer shot through with logic. Instead, Dewey
sees life as “precarious and uncertain, full of doubt and con-
flict” (Baker, 1955, p. 36). Dewey is rejecting his earlier Hege-
lianism and is “setting forth a naturalism that excludes any
transcendental element in the explanation of man’s experience”
(Rucker, 1969, p. 60). Thought has no final objective of reach-
ing Truth; its only objective is to attain a state of equilibrium—
plausible truths, warranted assertions—that solve current di-
lemmas while posing further inquiries.

With respect to the application of this developmental scheme
to children, Dewey remains essentially and persistently ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, Dewey attributes a certain degree of
natural scientific rationality to the child. For example, in How
We Think, Dewey wrote that:

this book represents the conviction . . . that the native and un-
spoiled attitude of childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, fertile
imagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near, very near,
to the attitude of the scientific mind. (Dewey, 1909, p. 179)

“Tendencies,” Dewey claims,

toward a reflective and truly logical activity are native to the
mind, and. . .they show themselves at an early period, since they
are demanded by outer conditions and stimulated by native curios-
ity. There is an innate disposition to draw inferences, and an inher-
ent desire to experiment and test. (Dewey, 1933a, p. 181)

On the other hand, and of critical importance to understanding
the meaning of development, Dewey insists that a truly culti-
vated scientific frame of mind depends on education for its
development. The child is a natural problem solver while, at the
same time, true or disciplined scientific procedures and rea-
soning must be learned.

Science is a name for knowledge in its most characteristic form. It
represents in its degree, the perfected outcome of learning,—its
consummation. . . . It consists of the special appliances and
methods which the race has slowly worked out in order to conduct
reflection under conditions whereby its procedures and results are
tested. // is artificial (an acquired art), not spontaneous; learned, not
native. To this fact is due the unique, the invaluable place of
science in education . . . (Dewey, 1916, pp. 196-197; emphasis

Scientific logic is an ideal that can only be attained under
proper conditions of education. “Effective intelligence is not an
original, innate endowment.. . . The actuality of mind is de-
pendent upon the education which social conditions effect”
(Dewey, 1927), and “the real problem of intellectual education
is the transformation of more or less casual curiosity and spo-

radic suggestion into attitudes of alert, cautious, and thorough
inquiry” (Dewey, 1933a, p. 181).

Dewey’s Critique of Development in Education

Dewey’s emphases on the social context of development also
reflected his dissatisfactions with the idea of development as it
had come to be used in educational circles and, more broadly,
with his commitment to a social psychology Dewey criticized
educational doctrines in which “development is conceived not
as continuous growing, but as the unfolding of latent powers
toward a definite goal” (Dewey, 1916, p. 61). Rousseau likened
the development of a child with “the development of a seed into
the full-grown plant” (Dewey, 1934, p. 195). Dewey felt that
Rousseau used this analogy to “draw the conclusion that in
human beings there are latent capacities which, if they are only
left to themselves, will ultimately flower and bear fruit”
(Dewey, 1934, p. 195). Consequently, proponents of develop-
ment in education “framed the notion of natural development
. . . a s opposed to directed growth which they regarded as arti-
ficial” (Dewey, 1934, p. 195). The metaphor of a seed is limited
because the seed’s future is “largely prescribed by its antecedent
nature” (Dewey, 1934, p. 195). The seed

. . . has not got the capacities for growth in different directions
towards different outcomes that are characteristic of the more
flexible and richly endowed human young. The latter is also, if
you please, a seed, a collection of germinal powers, but he may
become a sturdy oak, a willow that bends with every wind, a
thorny cactus, or a poisonous weed. (Dewey, 1934, p. 195; with

Unlike the seed, the child is plastic and in that plasticity lies the
possibility of many different ends being realized—some good
and desirable, others bad and undesirable.

Through the influence of Rousseau on Pestalozzi, Froebel,
and other educational theorists, Dewey felt that education “in
accordance with nature” had come to mean “that there were
certain intrinsic laws of development or unfolding, physical,
mental, and moral in children, and that these inherent princi-
ples of growth should furnish the norms of all educational pro-
cedure” (Dewey, 1912-1913, p. 289).

The child is expected to “develop” this or that fact out of his own
mind. He is told to think things out, or work things out for him-
self, without being supplied any of the environing conditions
which are requisite to start and guide thought. Nothing can be
developed from nothing; nothing but the crude can be developed
out of the crude—and this is what surely happens when we throw
the child back upon his achieved self as a finality, and invite him
to spin new truths of nature or of conduct out of that. (Dewey,
1902, p. 282)

In the case of reasoning, Dewey rejects a predetermined end
and substitutes growth as directed by classroom practices.
Again, we find that Dewey rejects the notion that the develop-
ment of thought represents the unfolding of a latent ability.

There is no ground for assuming that “thinking” is a special, iso-
lated natural tendency that will bloom inevitably in due season
simply because various sense and motor activities have been freely
manifested before; or because observation, memory, imagination,


and manual skill have been previously exercised without thought.
(Dewey, 1909, p. 231)

In thinking, the possibilities of multidirectionality, the poten-
tial for negative as well as positive, are present. The absence of
any kind of inevitability to the process points to the need for
systematic training with particular ends in mind.

Thinking may develop in positively wrong ways and lead to false
and harmful beliefs. The need of systematic training would be less
than it is if the only danger to be feared were lack of any develop-
ment; the evil of the wrong kind of development is greater.
(Dewey, 1933b, p. 129)

Just because . . . it [thinking] is an operation of drawing infer-
ences, of basing conclusions upon evidence, of reaching belief
indirectly, it is an operation that may be wrong as well as right, and
hence is one that needs safeguarding and training. The greater its
importance the greater are the evils when it is ill-exercised. (De-
wey, 1909, p. 195)

For Dewey, then, education is responsible for directing inquiry
toward desired social and intellectual ends.

Reasoning in Children and Adults

Unlike many of his contemporaries (cf. Baldwin, 1906-1915;
Hall, 1904), Dewey made no special claims for qualitative shifts
in reasoning in development. Dewey insists that “the power of
reasoning in little children does not differ fundamentally from
that of adults” (Dewey, 1913, p. 370) and that the apparent
differences between childish and adult mentality are functional
rather than structural. Because of differences in the materials
with which thinking is done and the “ends or objects for the
sake of which it is carried on, the impression is easily created
that the thinking itself is of a radically different order” (Dewey,
1913, p. 370). Thinking involves three elements for Dewey: (a)
an end to be reached or purpose to be achieved; (b) a method, or
the selection of means by which to arrive at such purpose; and,
(c) the possibility of new discoveries that lead to further inquiry
in working toward the end (Dewey, 1913, p. 370). Children and
adults appear to reason differently because they simply have
“different objects to think about and different purposes for
which to think” (Dewey, 1913, p. 370). The difference between
reasoning in children and adults lies in variations around the
purpose and means of solving problems and can be reduced to
two categories. “There are different objects to think about, and
different purposes for which to think, because children and
grownups have different kinds of acts to perform—different
lines of occupation” (Dewey, 1913, p. 370). Consistent again
with Dewey’s naturalism with its commitment to functional
analyses, differences in childish and adult thought reveal to
Dewey differences not so much in process as in the purpose of
thought—the active ends to which thought is applied.

The ends which a young child has are different from those of the
grown-up and the materials, means, and habits which he is able to
fall back upon are different, but the process—one involving these
three factors—is exactly the same. (Dewey, 1913, p. 372)

In contrast with the relatively unfocused nature of childish
thought, the objects and ends of adult thinking have a “defi-
nitely established character, have a more specialized organiza-
tion” (Dewey, 1913, p. 370). The difference then, between child-

ish and adult thought is a “difference in the psychological land-
scape . . . rather than a difference in the actual process of
thinking itself” (Dewey, 1913, p. 372). Development for Dewey
is associated then with an increase in the range of environments
in which the child is capable of conducting inquiry—recon-
structing experience. “Inquiry develops” for Dewey “as the cog-
nitively emergent way in which organisms, already functioning
precognitively at least in terms of survival, enlarge the range of
interactions with the environing world” (Margolis, 1977, p.
140). The development of reason for Dewey is associated not
with general structural reorganization® of thought, but with an
increase in the range and complexity of situations to which the
child is capable of applying reasoned inquiry. More recently,
Sheldon White and Alexander Siegel (1984) as well as Barbara
Rogoff (1990) have proposed similar approaches to cognitive

Rousseau further marred his assertion that education must
be a natural development and not something forced on or
grafted on individuals from without “by the notion that social
conditions are not natural” (Dewey, 1916, p. 65). Social condi-
tions are not only natural in the course of the child’s develop-
ment, the child’s development is absolutely dependent on such

Dewey contrasts what he calls the contemporary notion of
development with the older notion of development in two re-
spects. First, Dewey suggests that the contemporary idea of
development “insists that development must be measured from
the standpoints of specific ends to be attained. There is no
development at large going on” (Dewey, 1911, p. 422). Second,
the contemporary notion of development recognizes “the posi-
tive necessity of a favorable environment to secure develop-
ment” (Dewey, 1911, p. 422). “It is not enough,” Dewey argues,
“to eliminate arbitrary and perverting conditions; growth can-
not go on in a vacuum. As the body requires air and food, so
mind and character require a culture medium in order to de-
velop” (Dewey, 1911, p. 422). Specifically, the cultural medium
is responsible for determining the very direction of develop-
ment, or, as Dewey most consistently expressed it, growth. In
complex societies such as our own, the particular social institu-
tion responsible for directing growth is education.

For Dewey, the notion of development or growth is anchored
at one end by native interests, at the other end by social values,
and mediated by social institutions and practices.

Development, in short, has become a notion which, on one side
emphasizes the native and spontaneous existence, in the one edu-
cated, of the fundamental and initial factors of education, while,
on the other, it emphasizes the social nature of growth as aim and
the necessity of social conditions in order that growth may be in
the right direction. (Dewey, 1911, p. 422)

Dewey searched, in his doctrine of growth in the child, for a
middle course between the notion that development is a matter
of the inevitable unfolding of latent powers from within and the
notion that development is externally imposed from without.
He claimed that the alternative of growth “is not just a middle
course or compromise between the two procedures. It is some-
thing radically different from either” (Dewey 1934, p. 198; with

In contrast with the idea of development as the unfolding of
latent powers from within toward a remote end, growth has all


the time “an immediate end—the direct transformation of the
quality of experience” (Dewey, 1916, p. 82). Development then
“does not mean just getting something out of the mind. It is a
development of experience and into experience that is realty
wanted” (Dewey, 1902, p. 282). The immediate goals and objec-
tives of education are set by the interests and capabilities of the
child and are not imposed by adults as fixed ends. The subject
matter of education should be drawn from the child’s present
environment and from the child’s current interests. It is then up
to the educator to guide the child’s interests in relation to the
ideals of growth.

Existing likes and powers are to be treated as possibilities, as start-
ing points, that are absolutely necessary for any healthy develop-
ment. . . . The great problems of the adult who has to deal with
the young is to see, and to feel deeply as well as merely to see
intellectually, the forces that are moving in the young; but it is to
see them as possibilities, as signs and promises; to interpret them;
in short, in the light of what they may come to be. (Dewey, 1934,
pp. 198-99)


The fundamental factors in the educative process are in an imma-
ture, undeveloped being; and certain social aims, meanings, val-
ues incarnate in the matured experience of the adult. The educa-
tive process is due to the interaction of these forces. (Dewey, 1902,
P. 273)

Dewey’s experience in the laboratory school at Chicago
helped him to synthesize the doctrine of growth with educa-
tional theory and practice. Reaching what he considered to be a
technical definition of education, Dewey declared that educa-
tion “is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience
which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases
ability to direct the course of subsequent experience” (Dewey,
1916, p. 82). Education “means supplying the conditions which
foster growth” (Dewey, 1916, p. 56). Thus growth is a process in
which the organism enhances its ability to participate with its

Dewey’s doctrine of growth can be summarized by three
central propositions: (a) Education and growth are synonymous
with each other, (b) growth has ends neither external nor
beyond itself, and (c) the value of schooling depends on the
extent to which schooling creates a desire for and provides the
means for continued growth (Dewey, 1916, pp. 82-86). In its
baldest form, growth constitutes the only end—the only moral
end—of education—growth conceived as the capacity for more
growth. Education, growth, and inquiry thus become synony-
mous; the ideals for each hold good for the other; each is identi-
fied with “a constant reorganizing or restructuring of experi-
ence” (Dewey, 1916, p. 82).

Ideals of Growth

Dewey wisely recognized that “when it is said that education
is development, everything depends upon how development is
conceived” (Dewey, 1916, p. 54). Specifically, “unless growth
has a direction, there is no genuine development. Unless we
have antecedent knowledge of what is good, we do not know if
the development is desirable” (Hook, 1959, p. 12). Education,
although falling back on “the prior and independent existence
of natural powers,” is nonetheless concerned with “their proper

direction” (Dewey, 1909, p. 204). Education thus sets the direc-
tion of development “in order that growth may be in the right
direction.” It is the “business of the school to set up an environ-
ment in which play and work shall be conducted with reference
to facilitating desirable mental and moral growth” (Dewey,
1916, p. 196). A declaration of desired direction demands the
articulation of an ideal.

Unless we set up some definite criterion representing the ideal by
which to judge whether a given attitude or act is approximating or
moving away, our sole alternative is to withdraw all influences of
the environment lest they interfere with proper development.
(Dewey, 1916, p. 62)

Dewey leans hard on the ideals of democracy and science for
individuals and society. Classroom activities are designed to
bring about a fuller realization of these ideals. Specifically, it is
the transformation of experience toward the systematic appli-
cation of rational, empirical methods to shared problems that
emerge from a classroom atmosphere of cooperative inquiry
and activity that constitute the desired direction to the child’s
growth—the ideal of development—not as a static end but as
the ideal context for self-development. Experience is intrinsi-
cally social; intellectual and moral ideals develop in the child
through systematic, guided transformations of classroom expe-
riences. These ideals are themselves built up from experience
and, for Dewey, reflect the best and most appropriate ideals for
social life in a democratic society. In short, “the experimental
method is the only one compatible with the democratic way of
life, as we understand it” (Dewey, in Mayhew & Edwards, 1936,
p. 439). Dewey strives to articulate a necessary conjunction of
science with democracy as a social philosophy. This conjunc-
tion is first learned by experience as a pupil in a classroom and
later lived in adult life as a participating citizen in a democratic

On the intellectual side of growth, Dewey is most concerned
with the development of a critical mind, a mind attuned to
observation and experiment rather than individual bias or ac-
ceptance of a prejudice that might be imposed from some out-
side or arbitrary authority. In short, Dewey is concerned with
the development of objectivity in the broadest sense of the
word, a mode of reasoning mindful of the impartial authority
of evidence rather than the bias of either personal authority or
sentiment. On the moral side, Dewey is concerned with facili-
tating the political conditions in which this ideal of objectivity
will best flourish. Knowledge and politics become one as
science in the public forum becomes democracy in action. The
demand in the classroom

is for social intelligence, social power, and social interests. Our
resources are (1) the life of the school as a social institution in
itself; (2) methods of learning and of doing work; and (3) the
school studies or curriculum. In so far as the school represents, in
its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as the methods
used are those which appeal to the active and constructive powers,
permitting the child to give out; and thus to serve; in so far as the
curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material
for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he
has to play a part, and the relations he has to meet; in so far as
these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical base.
(Dewey, 1897a, p. 75)

Thus, the “school must be itself made into a vital social institu-
tion” and the school “cannot be a preparation for a social life


excepting as it reproduces, within itself, the typical conditions
of social life” (Dewey, 1897a, p. 61). A curriculum, Dewey in-

which acknowledges the social responsibilities of education must
present situations where problems are relevant to the problems of
living together, and where observation and information are calcu-
lated to develop social insight and interest. (Dewey, 1916, p. 200)

The educator’s task then becomes one of helping children to
systematize and direct those native tendencies toward socially
productive ends, ends that serve to enhance the child’s participa-
tion in the community.

It thus becomes the office of the educator to select those things
within the range of existing experience that have the promise and
potentiality of presenting new problems which by stimulating new
ways of observation and judgement will expand the area of fur-
ther experience. (Dewey, 1938b, p. 50)

In back of Dewey’s emphasis on growth through the recon-
struction of experience is his Hegelian conviction that reason
itself most fully realizes itself in action. Hence, the pupil in the
classroom must

have a genuine situation of experience—that there be a continu-
ous activity in which he is interested for its own sake; secondly, that
a genuine problem develop within this situation as a stimulus to
thought; third, that he possess the information and make the ob-
servations needed to deal with it; fourth, that suggested solutions
occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an
orderly way; fifth, that he have the opportunity and occasion to
test his ideas by application, to make their meaning clear and to
discover for himself their validity. (Dewey, 1916, p. 170)

The problem of education for Dewey is to discover the means
for making scientific thought more widespread in society and
giving it a deepening hold among people—for extending his
ideals for individual growth in the classroom into society.

. . . if scientific thought is not something esoteric but is a realiza-
tion of the most effective operation of intelligence, it should be
axiomatic that the development of scientific attitudes of thought,
observation, and inquiry is the chief business of study and learn-
ing. (Dewey, 1931a, p. 60)

In schools, “we want that type of education which will discover
and form the kind of individual who is the intelligent carrier of
a social democracy” (Dewey, 1918, p. 57). “[Sjince democracy
stands in principle for free interchange, for social continuity, it
must develop a theory of knowledge which sees in knowledge
the method by which one experience is made available in giving
direction and meaning to another” (Dewey, 1916, p. 354).

Growth and the Reconstruction of Society

By the turn of the century, Dewey had clearly expressed his
faith in the school as the most effective means for social prog-
ress. In 1897, Dewey wrote an essay for teachers entitled “My
Pedagogic Creed” and declared that “education is the funda-
mental method of social progress and reform” (Dewey, 1897b,
p. 93). In his 1922 treatise on social psychology entitled Human
Nature and Social Conduct, Dewey asserted that

a future new society may be created by a deliberate humane treat-
ment of the impulses of youth. This is the meaning of education;
for a truly humane education consists in an intelligent direction of

native activities in the light of the possibilities and necessities of
the social situation. (Dewey, 1922c, p. 69)

Faith in education as a source of progress “signifies nothing less
than belief in the possibility of deliberate direction of the for-
mation of human disposition and intelligence” (Dewey, 1922b,
p. 318). And “in directing the activities of the young, society
determines its own future in determining that of the young”
(Dewey, 1916, p. 46).

When the school is structured as a small society unto itself,
the child may “directly experience and develop the intellectual
and moral virtues to enable him to develop a better society”
(Bernstein, 1966, p. 41). In schools, we must create the type of
community that will foster the development of this scientific
intelligence. The school’s cultivation of science led Dewey to
conclude that “ultimately and philosophically, science is the
organ of general social progress” (Dewey, 1916, p. 239).

The teacher in this view is “a social servant set apart for the
maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the
right social growth” (Dewey, 1897b, p. 95). And the commu-
nity’s duty to education is therefore its “paramount moral duty”
because it is through education that “society can reformulate its
own purposes, can organize its own means and resources, and
thus shape itself with definiteness and economy in the direction
in which it wishes to move” (Dewey, 1897b, p. 95). When
teachers become “sufficiently courageous and emancipated” to
insist on an education that teaches discrimination, skepticism,
the suspension of judgment, an appeal to observation rather
than sentiment, and inquiry rather than conventional idealiza-
tions, then schools will “begin to be supremely interesting
places.” Schools will become interesting places because they
will have become part of a larger social and political process.
“For it will have come about that education and politics are one
and the same thing because politics will have to be in fact what
it now pretends to be, the intelligent management of social
affairs” (Dewey, 1922a, p. 334). Thus, the school “is recalled
from isolation to the center of the struggle for a better life”
(Cremin, 1961/1964, p. 119). The school is cast as a lever of
social change; educational theory “becomes political theory
and the educator is inevitably cast into the struggle for social
reform” (Cremin, 1961/1964, p. 118). In short, growth consid-
ered as the end of education is a political proposition.

[ W ] hen the school introduces and trains each child of society into
membership within such a little community, saturating him with
the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of
effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guar-
anty of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.
(Dewey, 1899b, p. 19-20)

And education for Dewey becomes “the supreme human inter-
est in which. . . problems cosmological, moral, logical, come
to a head” (Dewey, 1930, p. 160). Education thus provides
Dewey with the means for extending his ideals for individual
development to the social fabric as a whole because in schools
“we may produce . . . a projection in type of the society we
should like to realize” (Dewey, in Hofstadter, 1963, p. 378). The
real value of science and democracy lies in the kind of social
conditions they create for further individual growth and fulfill-
ment. In the process, psychology provides a tool for realizing


Psychology and Values

In his 1899 presidential address before the American Psycho-
logical Association entitled Psychology and Social Practice,
Dewey began to work through the social place and meaning of
psychology in culture. Psychology was for Dewey a tool
through which values can be both explored and realized—a
tool for understanding the means through which desired ends
in human affairs may be achieved. It cannot tell us what to do; it
cannot define what is good; but it can tell us how to achieve that
which we deem as good.

Psychology, after all, simply states the mechanism through which
conscious value and meaning are introduced into human experi-
ence. . . . Psychology will never provide ready-made materials
and prescriptions for the ethical life.. . . But science. . . makes
known the conditions upon which certain results depend, and
therefore puts at the disposal of life a method for controlling
them. Psychology will never tell us just what to do ethically, nor
just how to do it. But it will afford insight into the conditions
which control the formation and execution of aims, and thus en-
able human effort to expend itself sanely, rationally and with assur-
ance. We are not called upon to be either boasters or sentimental-
ists regarding the possibilities of our science.. . . But we are enti-
tled in our daily work to be sustained by the conviction that we are
not working in indifference to or at cross-purposes with the prac-
tical strivings of a common humanity. The psychologist in his
most remote and technical occupation with mechanism may be
contributing his bit to that ordered knowledge which alone en-
ables mankind to secure a larger and to direct a more equal flow of
the values of life. (Dewey, 1899a, p. 150)

Psychology becomes a tool in the reconstruction of values. And
to make declarations about good and bad development is to
make political proclamations. Development thus becomes a
political and moral idea. Dewey recognized this when he wrote:

To say that the welfare of others, like our own, consists in a widen-
ing and deepening of the perceptions that give activity its mean-
ing, in an educative growth, is to set forth a proposition of political
import. (Dewey, 1922c, p. 202)

Of the many connections between Dewey’s psychology and con-
temporary attempts to situate child development in culture and
history, perhaps this is the most important. As Kaplan (1967,
1986) and Kessen (1990) have reminded us, once we renounce
natural ends to development, we become politically, morally,
and scientifically engaged in determining both that which will
be considered good development and how we might best
achieve it.

A Final Word

Vygotsky and his commentators have taught us much about
the social bases of development by calling our attention to the
important ways in which culturally constituted tools mediate
thought. Dewey focuses our attention on the socially consti-
tuted values and social practices that stand beside or perhaps
even behind such tools. Dewey is not well known to contempo-
rary psychologists, nor did he exert a strong influence on the
emergence of a disciplinary psychology; there are many rea-
sons for such a state of affairs. To appreciate fully the cogency of
Dewey’s writings, one must, to some extent, immerse oneself in

Dewey’s own words and exercise the kind of patience implied
by such immersion. In his own day, Dewey’s proposals for a
psychology based on social values and practices reached
beyond the limits of available methods and empirical tools of
the time. Dewey’s conviction that psychology was a tool for the
realization of value had no place in a field that self-consciously
eschewed questions of value in its search for facts. But in these
days of centennial reflection, with the return to history, culture,
and value that such moments entail, perhaps we can learn
about the place of facts, values, and social practices in psychol-
ogy from a renewed acquaintance with the wisdom of John


Baker, M. C. (1955). Foundations of John Dewey’s educational theory.
New “Vbrk: Columbia University Press.

Baldwin, J. M. (1906-1915). Thought and things: A study in the develop-
ment and meaning of thought, or, genetic logic (4 vols). New York:
Putnam, (reprinted 1974 by Arno Press)

Bernstein, R. J. (1966). John Dewey. New York: Washington Square

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human development: Experi-
ments by nature and design. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Cahan, E. D., & White, S. H. (1992). Proposals for a second psychology.
American Psychologist, 47, 224-235.

Campbell, D. T. (1969). Reforms as experiments. American Psycholo-
gist, 24, 409-429.

Cremin, L. (1964). The transformation of the school. New York: Ran-
dom House. (Original work published 1961)

Dewey, J. (1884). The new psychology. EW (Vol. 1, pp. 48-60).’
Dewey, J. (1887). Psychology. EW(Vol. 2).
Dewey, J. (1896a). A pedagogical experiment. EW (Vol. 5, pp. 244-

Dewey, J. (1896b). The reflex arc concept in psychology. EW(Vol. 5, pp.

Dewey, J. (1896c). The university school. EW(Vo. 5, pp. 437-441).
Dewey, J. (1897a). Ethical principles underlying education. EW(Vo. 5,

pp. 54-83).
Dewey, J. (1897b). My pedagogic creed. EW (Vol. 5, pp. 84-95).
Dewey, J. (1899a). Psychology and social practice. MW (o. 1, pp.

Dewey, J. (1899b). The school and society. MW(Vol. 1, pp. 1-110).’
Dewey, J. (1900). Some stages of logical thought. M W (Vol. 1, pp. 151-

Dewey, J. (1901). The educational situation. MW(Vol. 1, pp. 257-314.)
Dewey, J. (1902). The child and the curriculum. MW (Vol. 2, pp. 271-

Dewey, J. (1903). Studies in logical theory. MW (Vol. 2, pp. 293-378).
Dewey, J. (1909). How we think. MW(Vol. 6, pp. 177-356).
Dewey, J. (1911). Development. MW(ol. 6, pp. 420-422).
Dewey, J. (1912-1913). Nature. MW(Vol. 7, pp. 287-291).
Dewey, J. (1913). Reasoning in early childhood. A W (Vol. 7, pp. 369-


1 Note. The references for the cited works by Dewey are taken from
the 37 volumes of The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1897 (1967-
1972; abbreviated EW); The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924
(1976-1983; abbreviated MW); and The Later Works of John Dewey,
1925-1953 (1981-1990; abbreviated LW). All volumes are published
by the Southern Illinois University Press (Carbondale, Illinois) under
the editorship of Jo Anne Boydston.


Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philo-
sophy of education. MW(Vo. 9).

Dewey, J. (1917). The need for social psychology. MW (Vol. 10, pp.

Dewey, J. (1918). Education and social direction. MW (Vol. 11, pp.

Dewey, J. (1922a). Education as politics. A W (Vol. 13, pp. 329-334).
Dewey, J. (1922b). Education as religion. MW (Vol. 13, pp. 317-322).
Dewey, J. (1922c). Human nature and conduct. MW(Vol 14, pp. 1-230).
Dewey, J. (1927). The public and its problems, i f f (Vol. 2, pp. 235-


Dewey, J. (1930). From absolutism to empiricism. LW(Vol. 5, pp. 147-

Dewey, J. (1931a). Science and society. LW(Vo. 6, pp. 49-63).
Dewey, J. (1931b). Social science and social control. LW(Vo. 6, pp.

Dewey, J. (1933a). The process and product of reflective activity: Psy-

chological process and logical forms. U P (Vol. 8, pp. 171-186).
Dewey, J. (1933b). Why reflective thinking must be an educational

aim. LW(Vol. 8, pp. 125-139).
Dewey, J. (1934). The need for a philosophy of education. LW (Vol. 9,

pp. 194-204).
Dewey, J. (1938a). Logic: A theory of inquiry. LW(Vol. 12).
Dewey, J. (1938b). Progressive organization of subject matter. LW (Vol.

13, pp. 48-60).
Dewey, J. &Bentley, A. (1949). Knowing and the known. LW(Vol. 16).
Gay, P. (1969). The enlightenment: An interpretation: The science of free-

dom (vol. 2). New York: Norton.
Hall, G. S. (1904). Adolescence: Its psychology and its relations to physi-

ology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion, and education.
(Vols. 1 & 2) New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Hofstadter, R. (1963). Anti-intellectualism in American life. New York:

Hook, S. (1939). John Dewey: An intellectual portrait. New York: John

Hook, S. (1959). John Dewey: Philosopher of growth. In S. Morgen-
besser (Ed.), Dewey and his critics: Essays from the Journal of Philo-
sophy. New York: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 9-17.

Kaplan, B. (1967). Meditations on genesis. Human Development, 10,

Kaplan, B. (1986). Value presuppositions in theories of human develop-
ment. In R. Lerner (Ed.) Developmental psychology: Historical and
philosophical perspectives (pp. 185-228). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Kessen, W (1990). The rise and fall of development. Worcester, MA:
Clark University Press.

Margolis, J. (1977). The relevance of Dewey’sepistemology. In S. Cahn
(Ed.), New studies in the philosophy of John Dewey (pp. 117-148).
Hanover, NH: University of New England Press.

Mayhew, K., & Edwards, A. (1936). The Dewey school: The laboratory
school at theVniversity of Chicago, 1896-1903. New York: Appleton-

Rockefeller, S. (1991). John Dewey: Religious faith and democratic hu-
manism. New brk: Columbia University Press.

Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: Cognitive development in
social context. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rucker, D. (1969). The Chicago pragmatists. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.

Scheffler, I. (1974). Four pragmatists: A critical introduction to Pierce,
James, Mead, and Dewey. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Smith, J. (1983). The spirit of American philosophy. New York: SUNY

White, M. (1964). The origins ofDewey’s instrumentalism. New Yjrk:
Octagon Books, Inc. (Original work published 1943).

White, S. H. & Siegel, A. (1984). Cognitive development in time and
space. In B. Rogoff & J. Lave (Eds.) Everyday cognition: Its develop-
ment in social context (pp. 238-277). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.

Received October 14,1991
Accepted October 29,1991 •

We’ve proficient writers who can handle both short and long papers, be they academic or non-academic papers, on topics ranging from soup to nuts (both literally and as the saying goes, if you know what we mean). We know how much you care about your grades and academic success. That's why we ensure the highest quality for your assignment. We're ready to help you even in the most critical situation. We're the perfect solution for all your writing needs.

Get a 15% discount on your order using the following coupon code SAVE15

Order a Similar Paper Order a Different Paper